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JUDICIAL REVIEW, A COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE: ISRAEL, CANADA, AND THE
UNITED STATES
INTRODUCTION
Malvina Halberstam∗
On April 26, 2009, the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law
hosted a roundtable discussion, Judicial Review, a Comparative
Perspective: Israel, Canada, and the United States, with prominent
jurists, statesmen, academics, and practicing attorneys.∗∗ The panel was
comprised of Justice Morris Fish of the Canadian Supreme Court;
Justice Elyakim Rubinstein of the Israeli Supreme Court; Judge Richard
Posner of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit;
Hon. Irwin Cotler, a member of the Canadian Parliament and formerly
Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada; Hon. Michael
Eitan, a Minister in the government of Israel, a member of the Knesset
(Israeli Parliament), and former chair of the Committee on the
Constitution, Law and Justice; Professor Daniel Friedmann, formerly
Minister of Justice of Israel, who proposed legislation to remedy what
some view as serious problems with judicial review in Israel; Nathan
Lewin, one of the most eminent attorneys in the United States, who has
argued many cases before the U.S. Supreme Court; Janice Sokolovsky,
a member of the U.S. and Israeli bars, who has drafted legislation to
regulate the role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as
petitioners before the Israeli Supreme Court; and Professors Elizabeth
Defeis, Marci Hamilton, Michael Herz, and Shlomo Slonim, all of
whom are prominent constitutional law scholars; an extraordinary panel
by any measure.
Professor Halberstam, who organized the Conference, addressed
specific questions to individual members of the panel; all members of
∗ Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. Professor
Halberstam organized the Conference and served as the moderator.
∗ ∗ The Conference was funded by the Floersheimer Center for Constitutional Democracy. It
was sponsored by the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, and cosponsored by the American
Association of Jewish Lawyers and Jurists (AAJLJ) and the American Branch of the International
Law Association.
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the panel were invited to intervene with comments. Following the
roundtable discussion, Professor Friedmann, Justice Rubinstein, and Mr.
Cotler made individual presentations. The Conference was transcribed
and the panelists were invited to edit and add to their oral remarks,
which several did. What follows is an edited transcript of the
roundtable discussion and of the individual presentations.
TRANSCRIPT1
PROFESSOR MALVINA HALBERSTAM: Judicial review is one
of the great gifts of American jurisprudence to the world. It was
established over 200 years ago by a decision of the U.S. Supreme
Court.2 It has recently been enshrined in the constitutions of a number
of new states. But, judicial review does not mean the same thing in
every country.
Judicial review in Israel, the United States, and Canada differ in a
number of respects, including whether there are limitations on the kinds
of questions the Court decides; whether the questions can be brought
directly to the Supreme Court or are filtered through lower court
decisions; whether Supreme Court review is as of right or in the Court’s
discretion; whether decisions are made by the Court as a whole or by
panels; and on how judges are appointed to the Court, all of which
affect the nature and scope of judicial review. More fundamentally,
how broad should judicial review be in a democracy? Should the courts
be the ultimate deciders of everything or should there be limitations?
I’ll begin by asking members of the panel to briefly summarize
how judges are selected in each country, whether review is discretionary
or as of right, whether the cases are heard by panels or by the Court as a
whole, and whether judicial review is based on the constitution,
legislation, or a decision of the Court. We’ll then proceed to discuss
substantive issues such as limitations, if any, on judicial review in each
of the countries, the pros and cons of such limitations, cases in which
the Court’s assertion of jurisdiction has been particularly controversial,
legislation proposed to address some of those problems—particularly in
Israel but, perhaps, in other countries as well—and a discussion of the
proper scope of judicial review in a democratic society, a question on
which there are very strong differences of opinion. We’ll conclude with
presentations by Professor Friedmann, Justice Rubinstein, and the
Honorable Irwin Cotler.

1 Transcript prepared by Ubiqus/Nation-Wide Reporting & Convention Coverage;
22 Cortlandt Street, Suite 802, New York, NY 10007.
2 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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I. THE COURT
A.

Structure

So, let me start with the first question. How are Justices appointed
to the Supreme Court, how many Justices sit on the Court? Perhaps we
can begin with the United States. Professor Herz, would you briefly
address that?
1.

The United States

PROFESSOR MICHAEL HERZ3: There are nine Justices on the
U.S. Supreme Court. The number is established by Congress, not by
the Constitution. The first Congress in the Judiciary Act of 1789 set the
number at six. Six is not an ideal number for a group that decides by
simple majority voting because you can have three-to-three outcomes,
but they stuck with six. Then, I believe, it went up to seven. During the
Civil War it went up to ten briefly. This was partly because of the
addition of another Circuit but it was mainly to give Abraham Lincoln
another appointment so that the Court would rule obligingly on some
pending constitutional issues. After Lincoln’s assassination when the
Congress was unhappy with President Johnson, it reduced the number
of Justices to six or seven, though by attrition, so that Johnson would
have no appointments. Once Ulysses S. Grant became President,
Congress put it back to nine, where it has stayed ever since.
That history says something to those who would say that Supreme
Court appointments have been uniquely and unprecedentedly politicized
in recent years. We have not gotten to the point, in this or the last
century, where the U.S. Congress changed the number of Justices in
order to allow or not allow a President to make an appointment.
What’s magic about nine? Nothing really. Presumably the idea is
the more the better. You get better decisions from a larger group, but
that’s balanced by a kind of unwieldiness that comes with a larger
group. The one other thing I would add is something that the Court
does not do but that has something to do with this question of the
number of Justices—whether one would imagine a system of
supermajority voting on the Court, in particular for questions of judicial
review. It is sometimes asserted that the Court should only strike down
a statute when it is absolutely clear that the statute is unconstitutional.
3 Professor of Law and Director, Floersheimer Center for Constitutional Democracy,
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law.
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That’s an impossible line to draw. It trades one line drawing problem
for another. But one could institutionalize that idea by requiring some
kind of super majority voting to strike down a statute. It ties into how
many Justices are on the Court.
2.

Israel

MINISTER MICHAEL EITAN4: The appointment of judges in
Israel is by a committee of nine: three Supreme Court Justices, two
government Ministers, two Knesset members, and two appointed by the
Israeli Bar. This is the formal composition of the committee and it
gives the three Justices of the Supreme Court nearly absolute power in
the nomination process. How? There are only three Supreme Court
Justices on the committee, but you have to take the political process into
consideration. The Knesset traditionally selects one member of the
opposition and one member of the coalition and when it comes to
nominating judges, especially to the Supreme Court, very often the two
representatives of the Knesset neutralize one another.5 The two Bar
representatives—maybe at least one of them, but most of the time both
of them—support the Supreme Court Justices on the committee. When
we speak about the government, the Justice Minister sees himself, most
of the time—Professor Friedmann was one of the exceptions—not as
someone who represents the people who elected him but as a
representative of the Supreme Court. In one case, the Minister stated
publicly that the Justices on the committee knew better than he what the
judicial branch needed so he would follow anything that they decided.
In such an environment, it is accepted in Israel that you can’t appoint a
judge, especially a Supreme Court Justice, without the consent of the
Justices on the committee.
Recently, we amended the law to provide that appointment of a
Supreme Court Justice requires seven votes.6 I personally didn’t know
what to do. I strongly oppose the present system, but if I voted for the
amendment it would give veto power to the three Justices. I was
convinced to vote for it only for the possibility that in certain situations
there would be another block on the committee that would have power
to negotiate.
These are the dilemmas we have in Israel. I want to bring one
example: the nomination of Elyakim Rubinstein—and I don’t want to
say a bad word about his nomination. I remember it clearly. I was a
4
5
6

Israeli Minister of Improvement of Government Services; Member, Knesset.
This applies to the appointment of all judges.
Courts Law (Consolidated Version) (Amendment No. 55), 5768-2008, No. 2176, S.H. 813
(Aug. 6, 2008).
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member of the committee and it was announced that the Supreme Court
Justices would vote for him. The subsequent procedures were like a
rubber stamp. Everyone knew that he was going to be nominated. So,
the Supreme Court controls judicial appointments in Israel.
JUSTICE ELYAKIM RUBINSTEIN7: Let me begin with a few
words about our judicial system. The Israeli judicial system has three
layers of courts: magistrate courts, district courts, and the Supreme
Court. It is, in this respect, a unified system. There are six district
courts in the various areas of the country, and there are numerous
magistrate courts. The magistrate courts deal with criminal and civil
matters up to a certain level stipulated by the law, and the family courts
are part of them too. Matters beyond that fall under the jurisdiction of
the district courts, which also serve as administrative courts (in certain
types of cases against government authorities stipulated by the law), and
as appellate courts on judgments of the magistrate courts. The Supreme
Court serves as a Court of Appeal on judgments of the district courts, in
criminal, civil, and administrative matters, and as a Court of original
jurisdiction in general administrative matters (known as High Court of
Justice cases), and also as a Constitutional Court, dealing with judicial
review issues. Israel does not have a full-fledged constitution, but there
are Basic Laws which have been recognized as constitutional texts,
relying also on the Declaration of Independence of the State of Israel.
I should add that there are also labor courts, military courts, and
religious courts of the various denominations (dealing mainly—but not
exclusively—with marriage and divorce). All are, in different ways,
subject to supervision of the Supreme Court, mainly as a High Court of
Justice.
The committee for the appointment of judges, now called the
“selection committee,” was established in 1953 and has been generally
commended—and, I think, even with some shortcomings, that it was
rightly praised, and that it is almost as good a system as one could hope
for. It consists of nine members—five professionals and four
politicians. There are two Knesset members (one traditionally comes
from the opposition) and two ministers—the committee is chaired by
the Minister of Justice, which is very important because he or she
controls the convening of the meetings. The five professionals are three
Justices of our Court (who include the President of the Supreme Court
and two others who rotate on a three-year basis, and who are elected by
seniority within the Court) and two Bar Association representatives.
One should remember that when it was established it was perceived as a
very important achievement compared to places where the Parliament or
the political system is exclusively involved in the appointment of
7

Israeli Supreme Court.
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judges, such as in the United States. Indeed, the three Justices of the
Supreme Court constitute an important part of the committee, but that
doesn’t mean they control the committee. I should add that there is a
process of screening by sub-committees—each consists of one Justice,
one Knesset member, and one Bar Association representative—who
also interview the candidates for judicial appointments.
In my view, the best proof of the system’s quality and
reasonableness is the fact that, historically, there has been a consensus
that the judiciary has been a success story in terms of the quality of its
members and decisions. Of course, some criticize it. But basically, it
has been a good system. Now the question is, what are the alternatives?
We have a good judiciary—professional and honest. It is not perfect.
But it has been a success story. It would be a pity if it became
politicized, by—for instance—changing the balance in the selection
committee, as some suggest.
PROFESSOR DANIEL FRIEDMANN8: The system for selecting
judges was introduced at a time when we did not have judicial review of
statutes and before the Court expanded its jurisdiction in the way it did.
It was a completely different legal system. The assumption was that we
were concerned with a purely professional body that dealt only with
civil appeals, criminal appeals, and review of administrative actions—
nothing more. So the question that arises is whether this method of
appointing judges should be retained after the Court decided that it also
has power to review statutes and after the legal system has been
changed so dramatically. My view is that it should not. I think that we
should change the system in a way that reduces the influence of the
Supreme Court Justices on the appointments so that we will be able to
introduce into the Supreme Court judges with somewhat different
views, backgrounds, and outlooks from those of the Justices that have
recently dominated the Court or were very influential. In other words,
the change in the function of the Court and its jurisdiction must affect
the way Justices are appointed. Therefore, during my term as Minister
of Justice, I supported the change in the law that Minister Eitan
mentioned—namely, that a majority of seven out of nine members of
the committee is required in order to elect a Justice to the Supreme
Court. Although this change gives the Supreme Court veto power, it
does not really increase their power since they have had a veto anyway.
But the new law also gives the politicians a veto, because usually the
Minister of Justice can get at least three votes; so there is a mutual
veto.9 I regard this as a temporary situation and I assume that we will
8 Former Israeli Minister of Justice; Professor (Emeritus) and Former Dean, Tel-Aviv
University Faculty of Law.
9 It seems that the new system had an effect at least in the recent appointment of Justices. In
October 2009 (namely after the Conference), three new Justices were appointed to the Supreme
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have to make additional changes in order to enable the system to reflect
more divergent approaches in the Supreme Court, which becomes
crucial when the Supreme Courts gets involved in political and other
controversial matters.
MR. NATHAN LEWIN10: An informational question: How are the
three Justices of the Supreme Court—those who are members of the
committee—selected? I think, for example, in terms of the U.S.
Supreme Court. If there were three Justices who participated in such a
committee, it would make a big difference how those three Justices
were selected. I’m wondering whether the three Justices are simply
selected at random, which would make it one kind of system, or
selected by the Chief Justice or the President of Court.
JUSTICE ELYAKIM RUBINSTEIN: The President of the Court is
always there. So you have two additional Justices and they simply
rotate. Their appointments are for three years by seniority.
MINISTER MICHAEL EITAN: Also historically, the Chief
Justices have always been selected by seniority. That is, when
somebody retired, the next one in line in terms of seniority would
become the Chief Justice. But we don’t know if this will be the
situation in the future.
PROFESSOR MALVINA HALBERSTAM: Looking at it from the
American perspective, I find it mind boggling that in Israel
appointments to the Supreme Court are essentially determined by the
President of the Supreme Court. For example, if Justice Warren
decided who would be on the Court when he was Chief Justice or,
conversely, if Justice Rehnquist decided who would be on the Court
when he was Chief Justice, we would have very different Courts than
we’ve had. And, while our system may have problems because it is a
political appointment, it tends to swing back and forth; we get some
liberal Justices; we get some conservative Justices. But if the Chief
Justice can always pick the new Justices on the Court, it seems to me
the Court will move in one direction only.
PROFESSOR DANIEL FRIEDMANN: Under the seniority
system that has hitherto obtained, when the committee elects a new
Justice to the Supreme Court you already know if he or she is going to
be the President. Since we have a compulsory retirement age, namely at
seventy, all that was required was that the new appointee was younger
Court. The President of the Supreme Court supported one of them (Uzi Fogelman). The two
other Justices that were elected (Neal Handel and Itchak Amit) did not previously serve on a
temporary appointment on the Supreme Court. The Justices of the Supreme Court have up to
now strongly objected to the appointment of a district court judge who was not “tested” in the
course of a temporary appointment to the Supreme Court. I strongly objected to this practice and
I regard the recent appointments as a step in the right direction. Apparently the Supreme Court
Justices had to compromise.
10 Lewin & Lewin LLP, Washington, D.C.
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than all the present members of the Court. I think that this system of
appointment by seniority is highly problematic. Whether it will
continue is not clear. It is based on tradition and on the committee’s
complying with the wish of the Supreme Court Justices. But the
appointment committee is not bound to follow this tradition. In
addition, I initiated a statute that was passed by the Knesset, which may
lead to a change although it does not directly deal with the issue of
seniority. This statute provides in essence that the term of the President
will not exceed seven years and also that he must have at least another
three years in office in order to be elected President.11 For example, if
upon the retirement of the President of the Supreme Court the next
person in line of seniority is sixty-eight years old, he will not, under the
new statute, become President, since he will have less than three years
to serve.
3.

Canada

PROFESSOR MALVINA HALBERSTAM: Mr. Cotler, you told
me that you changed the Canadian system based partly on the Israeli
system and rejected other parts of the Israeli system. Please tell us
about that.
MR. IRWIN COTLER12: If somebody had asked me when I was
appointed Minister of Justice in December of 2003 what my priorities
were, I would not have included the appointment of Justices amongst
them. At the end of my tenure, I was prepared to say that the
appointment of Justices was the most important thing that the Minister
of Justice did because that really is the legacy issue. That determines
the administration of justice, indeed, the integrity of the administration
of justice, long after those of us who have the temporary stewardship of
being Minister of Justice are there.
There are nine Justices on the Supreme Court of Canada. Under
the Supreme Court Act, and to reflect the bi-jural character of the civil
law and the common law and our geographical diversity, three of the
Justices must come from the civil law system of Quebec. The other six
are from the common law provinces, but they are chosen on a principle
of diversity of geographical representation. To that end, three come
from Ontario, two come from the Western Provinces, and one comes
from the Atlantic Provinces.
With respect to the appointments process itself, prior to my
11 Courts Law (Consolidated Version) (Amendment No. 45), 5767-2007, No. 2103, S.H. 382
(July 12, 2007).
12 Member, Canadian Parliament, Mount Royal; Former Canadian Minister of Justice and
Attorney General.
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becoming Minister of Justice, there were two considerations involved.
First was what might be called respect for the constitutional framework,
which vested the appointment of Justices in the executive branch of
government—that is, the Canadian Cabinet. In effect, it meant the
Minister of Justice in consultation with the Prime Minister. The
practice developed for the Minister of Justice to consult with certain
other stakeholders, namely the Chief Justice of Canada—and perhaps
other Justices of the Supreme Court—as well as the Chief Justices of
the courts of the provinces from which the vacancy arose. For example,
if it was from Ontario, then you would consult the Chief Justices of the
Superior Court of Ontario and the Court of Appeal of Ontario. If it was
the Western region, then it would be all the Chief Justices in the west.
In addition, the Minister would seek the opinion of the President of the
Canadian Bar Association or his or her designee, the President of the
Provincial Bar Association, and any other people whom it would be
deemed appropriate to consult.
The Cabinet of which I became a member was sworn in on
December 12, 2003. On that same day, the new Prime Minister, Paul
Martin, announced that the government would reform the Supreme
Court appointments process. That announcement surprised even me,
although I would be the one to carry it out, because I was not consulted
beforehand. While he made clear that the details were up to me, he
stressed the principle of prior parliamentary involvement in the
Supreme Court appointment process. This was a radical change in that
Canada had never before had parliamentary involvement in judicial
appointments, whether by way of constitutional or statutory requirement
or by conventions of practice. Appointments had been the prerogative
of the Cabinet.
Before I could even embark on the reform process, there were two
further unprecedented developments. Two sitting Judges of the
Supreme Court of Canada announced their resignation prior to having to
do so. Both resignations were to take effect on June 2004, which meant
that the reform process had to be dramatically accelerated.
I promptly appeared before the parliamentary Justice Committee,
under whose purview the reform process fell. There, I opened by
describing the existing protocol for judicial appointments, which had
not previously been discussed publicly. Since this protocol had worked
so well and had remained so admirably unpoliticized, I retained some
lingering doubts about the need for reform. Nonetheless, I proceeded to
outline the criteria I felt should continue to guide the selection process.
First was the merit principle. Excellence had to be the overriding
criteria, alongside consideration of diversity to reflect Canada’s
multicultural nature. Second, the integrity of the Supreme Court must
always be preserved. In other words, the new process must not damage
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the reputation of any of the appointees. Third, promotion and protection
of the independence of the judiciary. Fourth, transparency. Fifth, the
value of provincial input because of the country’s Federal Constitution.
And sixth, the value of parliamentary input, which had previously been
non-existent.
To make a long story short, the end result of the reforms was a
four-stage process developed through consultations with Parliament,
academics, and the judiciary—both domestically and abroad. In the
first stage, the Minister of Justice would continue as before to consult
comprehensively with the actors described above to develop a shortlist
of five to eight candidates for appointment. At the second stage, the
Minister of Justice would appoint a nine-person advisory committee; the
Israeli model was influential here. This advisory committee would
consist of four Members of Parliament, one from each federal party. It
would also comprise one retired judge, appointed by the Canadian
Judicial Council, to represent the views of the judiciary; one
representative of the provincial Attorney General; and one
representative from the provincial Bar Association. This allowance for
Canada’s federal nature was a departure from the American and Israeli
models. In Canada, we are required by law to draw upon regional and
provincial perspectives. Finally, the advisory committee allowed for
public input, inviting suggestions of candidates through major
newspapers. Interestingly, the recommendations received actually
dovetailed with the ultimate appointees. The public was better informed
than one might think on these matters. The third stage involved
comprehensive consultation by the advisory committee with respect to
the same criteria as had always informed the process, as a result of
which the advisory committee would provide the Minister of Justice
with a shortlist of three people drawn from the Minister’s original list of
five to eight. In the fourth stage, the Minister of Justice in consultation
with the Prime Minister would make the executive appointment from
that short list.
Almost as soon as we had articulated this process, a third Justice of
the Supreme Court announced he was stepping down, having come to
the mandatory retirement age. However, just as we came to the fourth
and final step in choosing his replacement, an election intervened and it
was left for the next government to make the ultimate decision.
Following the election, I spoke to the incoming Minister of Justice
and advised him as to my choice from among the shortlisted names.
Fortuitously, the new Minister agreed, and Justice Rothstein was
appointed. Interestingly, we already at that point had two Jewish
Justices on the Supreme Court of Canada, Justice Morris Fish and
Justice Rosalie Abella. This would have been the third Jewish Justice
of the nine. In a way, I felt, it was better that I not be the one to make
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that appointment.
As for the reformed appointments process, before finalizing the
appointment of Justice Rothstein, the new government made one
addition, influenced by the American approach. I had opted not to
include a public hearing before a parliamentary committee since I felt it
might invite a politicized process. But I came around because the new
government’s approach to the hearing involved certain ground rules
with respect to the kinds of questions that could be asked and was
presided over by the most distinguished constitutional law professor in
Canada, Peter Hogg. There were no questions really asked about the
personal belief systems of the candidate. It was very professional. The
hearing was intended to be less adversarial than the American
procedure, and that was because our Constitution is also different from
that of the United States; Canada’s Constitution does not require the
consent of Parliament. The four-stage process that I formulated gave
Parliament an advisory role only. So that made for a more conciliatory
hearing.
In sum, this major change to Canada’s appointment process was
not uninfluenced by the practices in Israel and the United States.
MR. NATHAN LEWIN: Minister Cotler, under the new process,
did you consult with sitting members of the Canadian Supreme Court?
I would love to hear what Judge Posner would say about all this,
because to somebody in the American system, with the separation of
powers, it would almost be scandalous for the President in appointing a
Supreme Court Justice to be consulting with sitting Supreme Court
Justices.
MR. IRWIN COTLER: Not only did I consult with the sitting
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court with regard to appointments, but I
also made it public that the Minister of Justice does consult with the
Chief Justice and could consult with other members of the Supreme
Court. I consulted with the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and
through the Chief Justice I sought, as best as possible, the views of the
Court. It was left up to her to make that determination as to who she
would consult and how she would convey it to me. In sum, in Canada
there is a judicial contribution to the process. But the judicial
contribution has to be seen as part of the larger advisory process.
JUSTICE MORRIS FISH13: Minister Cotler has taken such care in
outlining the current procedure so that you’ll realize how fortunate I am
to have been appointed under the previous system. My question is,
Minister Cotler, in the half century prior to my appointment, has there
been criticism of even a single appointee?
MR. IRWIN COTLER: As discussed, March 2004 saw the first13

Canadian Supreme Court.
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ever parliamentary hearings in connection with a judicial appointment.
Then, as in previous appointment processes, I was not aware of any
public criticism of an appointee on either political or ideological
grounds. That may be a product of the political culture in Canada.
People would have felt it might somehow diminish the integrity of the
Court, its perceived excellence, if it were to be politicized.
Interestingly, in the appointments in which I was involved, we used a
confidentiality agreement. Everyone whom I consulted as Justice
Minister would enter into a written confidentiality agreement as to the
consultations. There was never any breach of the confidentiality
agreement. I am not sure this would have been the case in other
political cultures, including that of Israel. Confidentiality was always
observed and I think that was an important part of why the process was
able to work.
JUDGE RICHARD POSNER14: You know there’s an analogy in
the United States. President Carter appointed advisory commissions to
advise on appointment of federal court of appeals judges, and they were
a fake. Elaborate search processes usually are phony. That is to say,
the person who comes out at the other end is the person who would
have been picked anyway. President Carter wanted to give the
impression of consultation, promote diversity, and bring some laymen
into the process. So there were laymen on his commissions, who would
ask goofy questions of the candidates. It was part of an obsession with
process, an obsession that seems to be part of modern democratic
government. I don’t think it has any benefits. I think that Frankfurter in
1939 was the first Supreme Court nominee—or probably any federal
judicial nominee—who had an oral hearing before the Senate Judiciary
Committee. Initially the hearings were perfunctory, but gradually they
became more searching, involved a deeper background search, and so
on, and some people who lacked professional qualifications, like Harriet
Miers, whom you recall President Bush tried to put on the Supreme
Court, got excluded because of the enhanced procedures. But I don’t
think the Supreme Court has improved over what it was before.
JUSTICE ELYAKIM RUBINSTEIN: Since I will become kind of
the defender of our system here, with my two colleagues having
different views, let me just add as an informational point, that the
candidates have been suggested either by the Minister of Justice or by
the Chief Justice or by any three members of the committee.
This used to be a secret and also the names of the candidates. Now
this has been amended. Now the names are made public thirty days
before the committee convenes. So anybody who has anything to say
can do so before the appointment. For instance, when I was appointed,
14

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
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there were people who wrote to the committee. The committee sent me
the material and asked me to comment on it. The best proof, I think,
that the system is not “controlled” by the Justices, although they do
have a very important weight, is that Minister Friedmann has been able
to appoint two practicing lawyers from the private sector to the Court,
which was unprecedented, except for during the very beginning of the
Court.
PROFESSOR MARCI HAMILTON15: I wouldn’t exaggerate the
notion in the United States that the Justices aren’t involved because a
retiring Justice always, unless they’re incompetent, pays a courtesy call
on the President to inform him about the retirement before it happens
and those conversations don’t infrequently involve the question “is there
anyone you would particularly recommend.” Now, in the United States,
though having had that conversation, the President is perfectly capable
of ignoring every name and there are documented cases where the
President has ignored suggestions by a Justice. So, some Justices are at
least a voice in the process, but they can be ignored and have been
ignored. I think that the big difference between the procedures you’re
describing in Israel and the United States is that here interest groups are
capable of capturing the appointment process. In the Bush
Administration, it was common knowledge that the Federalist Society
was the primary vetter of appointees and that one person in the
Federalist Society was the primary individual. So I’m going to disagree
with Judge Posner. I think that these procedures can be important if for
no other reason than you can’t have one entity in Washington
controlling the string of names that’s given to the President. The one
break in the Bush Administration in which they did not follow the
procedure that we all knew was going on otherwise was Harriet Miers,
which the President did without consultation with the Federalist Society
and she came down. So I think that the American system is not quite as
removed from the Justices as it might seem but I also think that it’s
perfectly capable of capture. We’ve just been through eight years where
it was pretty clear.
JUDGE RICHARD POSNER: There have been times in the United
States when a Chief Justice was consulted by or thrust his views on the
White House. Chief Justice Taft was very aggressive in trying to make
sure that no liberals got on the Supreme Court; and I think Chief Justice
Burger must have been the person who suggested Blackmun as an
appointment by Nixon. I can’t imagine where else Blackmun’s name
would come from. But the idea of picking one’s successors is I think
very questionable. So it’s a strength of the United States that we
generally don’t have that practice.
15

Paul R. Verkuil Chair in Public Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law.
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PROFESSOR DANIEL FRIEDMANN: I want to add my insight
as a politician. The main lesson that comes out from our system is that
in order to get a seat on the Supreme Court, or even on the lower courts,
you should be loyal to the system. The question is not whether you are
more qualified, because to everybody in Israel it is clear that anybody
who seeks a seat on the Supreme Court must be loyal to a particular
ideology. No jurist who was against judicial activism had, at least up to
now, even a slight chance to get the seat. So the nomination method in
Israel is part of judicial activism and it serves that policy—and we have
to change it.
JUSTICE ELYAKIM RUBINSTEIN: What’s your alternative?
PROFESSOR DANIEL FRIEDMANN: My alternative is to reduce
the number of Supreme Court Justices on the Committee or to add a
member of Parliament and also an academician elected by the
Presidents of the Israeli universities.
JUSTICE ELYAKIM RUBINSTEIN: Let me then add, that in my
book, Judges of the Country,16 which came out back in 1980, I praised
our system for selecting judges (including Supreme Court Justices)
through a selection committee, which had been introduced, as I
mentioned before, via legislation in 1953 as an original Israeli
contribution. It is a balanced system, giving the non-political people the
majority within the nine-person committee, while the four political
members are the minority.17 I do not think a change is necessary; I still
believe that the system is fine.
MR. IRWIN COTLER: Just to comment on what Judge Posner
said, namely that the Justices appointed at the end of the reformed
process we introduced would have been the same ones appointed
without the process. I think that is true.
Simply because there was agitation for the process to be reformed
coming from the opposition—at the time, a conservative opposition
ideologically somewhat like the Republican ideology in the United
States—on the ground that the original process was secretive.
Journalists, too, demanded that it be opened up. Academics demanded
that it be opened up and the then-Prime Minister, my boss, wanted it
opened up. So, reform was inevitable, and while I believe we would
have the same two Justices as a result of the original process, the
reformed process gave those Justices greater validation.
One footnote: After the appointment of Justice Abella, a journalist
came to see me and asked about Justice Abella because, by some in the
16
17

ELYAKIM RUBINSTEIN, SHOFTEY ERETZ [JUDGES OF THE COUNTRY] (1980).
Let me also add, that after this Conference was held, three new Justices were appointed by
consent from among the district court judges. Only one of them served before as an acting Justice
on the Supreme Court, and not all of them may have initially been supported by all of the Justices
on the committee. See supra note 9.

2010]

JUDICIAL REVIEW

2407

configuration of constituencies consulted, she was deemed to be
somewhat of a controversial figure. The journalist said to me, “I
understand that you’re a friend of Justice Abella.” I said, “No, not just a
friend, a very good friend. But then again if you want to eliminate all of
the people with whom I am friendly, including all my former students,
you’d have to exclude a lot of people from the appointment process.”
Then he said, “I understand that Justice Abella is Jewish, and you’re
Jewish.” He asked whether that had been an issue. I replied that I had
considered the matter, specifically in light of our Charter of Rights and
Freedoms. Section 15 prohibits discrimination on grounds of religion. I
was obliged by the Constitution not to take religion into consideration.
At that point he said to me, “Well, I guess I don’t have a story.” I said,
“Well, no, you do have a story. Not the story that you came in to write,
but you have the whole appointments process.” I should note that, at
the outset, he had asked if he could tape the interview. I said yes, and
noted that I would be taping it as well. At the end of the exchange I
said, “You see that tape? I’m just going to go ahead and have that tape
reproduced so that people can understand the exchange that took place.”
He said, “You wouldn’t do that, would you?” I said, “Why not?
You’ve taped it. You could do it. I can do it. I’m going to put it out.”
To sum it up, the person resigned as a journalist within ten days.
JUSTICE MORRIS FISH: My experience has been—in this and in
related matters—that one must take care in attempting to implant into
one’s own system a procedure that appears to have worked well in
another jurisdiction. I found that out early at a conference at NYU
where we talked about American judges and Canadian judges. Some of
them were elected. And to the American judges, the notion that I was
appointed by the Prime Minister and Minister of Justice was equally
troublesome. So we have to take great care. I want to say that Minister
Cotler is to be commended for both heeding advice and anticipating
concerns in modifying the process for appointing Justices to the
Supreme Court of Canada. He took a very balanced approach and
sought to learn from both the Israeli and American processes without
losing sight of the fact that Canada has a different appointment
tradition.
B.

Scope of Review

PROFESSOR MALVINA HALBERSTAM: The next series of
questions: Does the Court sit in panels or as a whole? If it sits in panels,
how many Justices are on a panel and how are they selected? Can cases
be brought directly to the Supreme Court? Does the Court have
discretion whether to take a case, and if yes, what are the criteria?
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Canada

JUSTICE MORRIS FISH: In most cases the full Court sits.
However, five Justices constitute a quorum18 and from time to time,
seven or five will sit. A panel of five is rare, and occurs typically in a
case of an as of right appeal, for example where there has been a dissent
on a question of law in the Court of Appeal in a criminal matter. So in
those cases there will sometimes be only five. Sometimes the dissent
may flag an important question and although five Justices can hear the
appeal, the Chief Justice may instead empanel all nine.
How is the panel selected? Since all nine Justices sit in most cases
there is no difficulty. In other cases, the Chief Justice will select the
panel. Sometimes, one of the Justices—for one reason or another—will
be unable to sit. For example, if the Justice was part of the panel in the
Court of Appeal that decided the matter now appealed to the Supreme
Court, that Justice cannot sit. That is pursuant to the Supreme Court
Act.19 Any Justice of the Court not already assigned to sit has the right
to request that he or she form part of the panel and such a request—
however rare—will generally be accommodated by the Chief Justice.
Cases apart from the criminal appeal exception that I mentioned
and the Reference jurisdiction, which I will explain in a moment, can
come to the Court only with leave of the Court. We receive about 700
applications for leave annually. The leave applications are distributed
among three separate panels of three Justices each. The three Justices
on that panel will study the file and make a recommendation to the other
two members of the panel. However, all Justices have an opportunity to
raise an issue concerning leave. I would therefore emphasize that
although the final decision is that of the three Justices who are seized of
the application, the decision of those three will be circulated to the
others who may comment on the panel’s provisional decision. On this
point, I don’t want to get into the technicalities of the process. I would
simply say that at a monthly conference of the Court, any Justice who
feels that a panel has overlooked an issue of importance, or
alternatively, that there are other cases that have recently been decided
on the same point, is free to draw that to the panel’s attention. Now I’m
told that in the United States, Judge Posner, there is a rule of four. Is
that correct?
JUDGE RICHARD POSNER: That’s correct.
JUSTICE MORRIS FISH: So in our system there is no firm rule of
four, but if there is a strong sentiment to hear an appeal, the panel will
18
19

Supreme Court Act, R.S.C., ch. S-26, § 25 (1985).
Id. § 28(1).
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normally accommodate that desire in its vote. The thought is that since
the applications are divided on a random basis, it would be unfortunate
if a litigant who would have had this one last opportunity to be heard if
the application for leave had gone to another panel, is by the rule of
chance, excluded.
I mentioned that the Supreme Court of Canada has another
jurisdiction and this might seem a bit odd to American ears. Section 53
of the Supreme Court Act provides that the Governor-in-Council—
essentially the Cabinet—can refer any question to the Court. Generally,
this will take the form of a proposed statute, but this is not always the
case. Whether the Court is obliged to pronounce on all aspects of the
question is an issue that has been raised before the Court. In fact, the
Court has said that it is not bound to do so.20 Notably, this was
articulated in the Same-Sex Marriage Reference21 and the Quebec
Secession Reference.22 In fact, the very power of reference itself was
held to be constitutionally permissible in the Reference re References in
1912.23
What are the criteria applied in granting leave? The criteria are set
out in Section 43 of the Supreme Court Act. The question is whether
the application for leave raises an issue of public importance or involves
an issue which is otherwise important. The distinction between the two
is that a question may not be of truly national importance, but it may be
quite important in a particular field of law. Moreover, the statute has a
wonderful concluding catch-all phrase that states that if the Court for
any purpose deems that the matter is one which warrants a decision by
the Supreme Court of Canada, we are empowered by the statute to take
it.
MINISTER MICHAEL EITAN: How many cases do you consider
each year?
JUSTICE MORRIS FISH: We hear generally about the same
number as the Supreme Court of the United States, perhaps a few more.
Approximately eighty a year.

20 See, e.g., Re: Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753, 768 (Can.),
available at http://csc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/1981/1981scr1-753/1981scr1-753.html.
21 Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698 (Can.), available at
http://csc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/2004/2004scc79/2004scc79.pdf.
22 Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.), available at
http://csc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/1998/1998scr2-217/1998scr2-217.html.
23 Reference re References by Governor-General in Council, [1910] 43 S.C.R. 536, aff’d,
[1912] A.C. 571 (Can.).
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The United States

PROFESSOR ELIZABETH DEFEIS24: The answer to the question
of whether the Supreme Court sits in panels in the United States is quite
simply, “no.” The Court does not sit in panels, but it does require a
minimum of six Justices in order to hear oral arguments and to decide a
case. Often this quorum is not met because of illnesses of Justices or
because of conflicts of interest of Justices.
One recent case that came up to the U.S. Supreme Court, and was
greatly anticipated by international lawyers, was brought under the
Alien Tort Claims Act. It involved a claim based upon aiding and
abetting the apartheid regime in South Africa, and the question was
whether or not that case could be decided by the federal district court.25
Ultimately, the case went to the Supreme Court, but the Court was
unable to decide the case. Because the litigation involved many
corporations as parties, a number of Justices recused themselves, and
the Court did not have a quorum. So we are still waiting for a proper
case to come to the Court in order for the Court to decide the question.
Does the Court have discretion whether to take a case? Since
1988, the Court has almost unfettered authority with respect to the kinds
of cases that it will take. Previously, under mandatory jurisdiction, the
Court was required to take cases in certain categories, for example,
when a state court held a federal law invalid, or a state law valid under a
challenge to federal law. Congress revised the rules in 1988, so that
now, with few exceptions, the only route to the Supreme Court is by
petition for certiorari. There are about 10,000 cases per year that come
to the Court through this method, and the Court must decide whether or
not it will grant certiorari. Indeed, it takes only about 100 cases a year
out of that great number. The criteria for the Court’s current method
was stated quite well by Justice Rehnquist: The case must first raise a
federal question to which different courts had given conflicting answers,
or cases in which an appellate court decided a case in conflict with
governing Supreme Court precedent.26 Of course, one must satisfy the
Court’s jurisdictional requirements, for example, that the parties have
standing. Then the Court has wide discretion with respect to deciding
which cases it will accept through the certiorari route, usually cases
24
25

Professor of Law and Former Dean, Seton Hall University School of Law.
Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 553 U.S. 1028 (2008) (denying cert because the Court
lacked a quorum, 28 U.S.C. § 1 (2006); since a majority of the qualified Justices were of the
opinion that the case could not be heard, affirming the judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 2109 (2006),
which provides that under these circumstances the Court shall enter its order affirming the
judgment of the court from which the case was brought for review with the same effect as an
affirmance by an equally divided Court).
26 WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 224-38 (2001).
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which it deems most important and should be authoritatively decided by
the highest Court.
MR. NATHAN LEWIN: Back in the days when Judge Posner and
I clerked for Justices on the Supreme Court, in the 1960s, the Supreme
Court decided approximately 150 cases a term. Now there are twice as
many law clerks per Justice but they decide only half as many cases.
They decide seventy-five cases per term.
JUSTICE MORRIS FISH: Are the opinions three times as long?
MR. NATHAN LEWIN: The writing may be substantially longer.
But in those days, each Chamber—both the law clerk and the Justice—
would read the petitions for certiorari and review them themselves.
Now it is an open secret that there is a “cert pool” so that one
memorandum is written for at least seven of the Justices and the Justices
themselves do not read the petitions. Justice Alito, I’m told, has now
withdrawn from the cert pool. Justice Stevens was never in the cert
pool, but all the other Justices rely on the summary that’s written by one
law clerk of the many law clerks that the Supreme Court has.
PROFESSOR MARCI HAMILTON: Actually it has been broken
down to two. There are two cert pools in the Court right now out of
those seven Justices. I clerked from 1989-1990, and at that time we
were writing memos for four Justices and we had about 7000 cases
coming in. There are 13,000 cases coming into the Court right now and
the Court is taking about seventy-five. So a lot of the petitions are just
scanned and thrown aside.
JUDGE RICHARD POSNER: It is an extraordinary paradox.
Usually you think that if the inputs into some production process
increase in quantity and quality, the output will increase in quantity or
quality. So as Mr. Lewin said, in the olden days, the 1960s, Supreme
Court Justices had only two law clerks, most of whom came directly
from law school; and now they each have four or five law clerks who
have clerked for at least a year for another judge and have been more
carefully screened (in part because there is more competition to become
a Supreme Court law clerk) and often have more extensive experience.
And the cert pool has economized on the time of law clerks. Yet
despite all that, the number of cases the Court decides has greatly
diminished. The opinions are somewhat longer, they’re more learned,
they’re more polished in a professional sort of way, but I don’t think
anyone really thinks the Supreme Court is better than it was forty years
ago. It’s different. If you’re a conservative, you like it more now; if
you’re a liberal, you don’t. But it’s not improved. It seems that in
government you can keep adding procedures, personnel, and so on, and
yet you don’t actually get any additional social product.
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Israel

JUSTICE ELYAKIM RUBINSTEIN: I envy the U.S. and the
Canadian systems. Eighty cases a year is great. We in the Israeli
Supreme Court are like latter day slaves. Except for not actually having
a chain on my leg, my colleagues and I are basically in that situation.
Last year we finished with over 11,000 cases. We are at this point
twelve Justices. We could be up to fifteen, but there was haggling and
controversy and then elections, so there were no appointments in the
last year, year-and-a-half.27 We sit basically in panels of three, which is
the regular rule. That is in criminal, civil, or administrative law cases.
In most of the cases we do not have the option of not taking them
because they are appeals from the district courts on criminal or civil or
administrative law cases which started there, and which we have to take.
There are cases heard in a one-person panel, mainly detentions,
injunctions, and leave requests. We have Justices on Call, two each
month, and they take many cases which are detentions, injunctions, or
stays, and a major part of their work is a one-person panel. Since
legislation passed back in 1996, every detention case can be brought by
right, not by leave, to the Supreme Court. Of course, not all of them are
brought, but many are. So, for instance, I was Justice on Call in
December 2008 and then in March 2009; for the two months together, I
had to conduct over 150 hearings in detention cases. Many of them
shouldn’t be on the docket of the Supreme Court, but they are there by
law. That is besides the regular workload done in the panels of three.
We sit in bigger panels in matters of special importance, usually the
three original Justices and whoever has been added. The composition
of the larger panel is decided by the President of the Court or her
deputy. So in such cases, the panel could be enlarged to five, seven,
nine, or even eleven or thirteen if it’s a constitutional case.
Constitutional cases, in the last fourteen years, have always been
decided by large panels. I will come to them later.
We do have partial discretion in deciding whether to take certain
cases—it is very limited. That is in the request for leave if a case has
already gone through the two levels of law courts—magistrate and
district courts. But if it began in the district court, we don’t have the
option to deny a hearing. And, unlike the American tradition, for
instance, where the Supreme Court writes “cert denied” without further
explanation, in our system the tradition is that you explain why you do
not grant leave. This decision is not a precedent, but many lawyers use
it in later cases as if it were.
27

Three more justices were appointed in October 2009.
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The leave request is dealt with by one Justice. If the Justice thinks
it is worth bringing to a hearing, he will refer it to a panel. I myself deal
with many leave requests as a third layer in civil cases, and most of
them are rejected but with an explanation.
The most prominent issues in the public eye are of the Supreme
Court sitting as the High Court of Justice, known as Bagatz (Beit
Mishpat Gavo’ha Le’Tzedek). These are administrative law issues of
original jurisdiction coming to the Supreme Court. Over the years, the
request for standing or locus standi was abolished by judicial decisions.
When I was in law school, in the late 1960s—ancient history—we were
taught that you are supposed to show standing when you want to bring a
case to the High Court of Justice. Over the years, for various reasons,
including the wish to give the public better access to the Court in
administrative matters, and also to provide access to Palestinians from
the territories administered by Israel, the Court has basically abolished
the “standing” requirement.
The High Court of Justice cases come first to the Justice on Call.
He or she will decide whether to request—and usually does request—a
response from the relevant government agency, and they respond.
Sometimes it’s urgent, certainly in human rights issues. Urgent cases
could be heard even on the same day or the next day. Sometimes I’m
called by the Court registrar, asking if I can sit at six in the afternoon
that very day on a panel. In some cases, though, we would decide that
there is no justification for a hearing and we would dismiss the case by
a three Justices panel written decision. The “regular” cases are brought
to a hearing.
The Court has been criticized for judicial activism. Let me say that
having served, inter alia, as attorney general, government secretary, and
legal adviser to two ministries, that in having been for many years in
government positions, I expressed my views on it in former incarnations
and I can say it now also as a Justice of the Court. From the public
point of view of better government, if you balance between the huge
volume of cases which the Court took and decided on one hand, and the
controversial issues for which it is criticized on the other hand, I have
no doubt that the benefit to the public over the years by the Court is by
far greater than the controversy on some issues which sometimes I
myself would have thought could be approached otherwise. To sum up:
The Court’s work is indeed very heavy, and it could be reduced by
legislation. But it is not the “judicial activism” which creates the
problem. And indeed, many of the Court’s critics are themselves
submitting High Court petitions to it time and again. Finally, in
response to Mr. Eitan: I have been a supporter—in fact, an enthusiast—
for many years of the existing appointments system. In fact, as I
mentioned before, I was one of the first to write on it in 1980 in Judges
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of the Country,28 the first book written—I believe—on the history of our
Court.
4.

Direct Review by the High Court: Israel’s Unique Process

PROFESSOR MALVINA HALBERSTAM: Have the cases
brought to the High Court ever been heard by another court?
JUSTICE ELYAKIM RUBINSTEIN: Basically, the answer is no,
definitely as far as courts from the general system, whose decisions are
subject to appeal. The High Court of Justice cases are original
jurisdiction and they’re brought right to the Supreme Court. There are
some administrative law cases which go first to the district courts in
their administrative capacity. But the basic High Court of Justice
original jurisdiction is widely used. One of the Justices once wrote that
a new custom has emerged—somebody reads a newspaper article and
says “oh, come on, let’s go up to Zion and I’ll put in a petition.” But
many cases are of importance, and render a great service to the public,
to which I can attest—as I mentioned before—as a former government
civil servant. I should add, though, that some of the High Court
petitions concern decisions of religious courts or labor courts, where
there is no appeal to the Supreme Court. The judicial policy of
intervention in these cases is very restrained.
PROFESSOR MALVINA HALBERSTAM: If I’m correct, neither
the U.S. Supreme Court nor the Canadian Supreme Court has that
process where people can come directly and petition the Court.
MR. NATHAN LEWIN: There are original cases in the U.S.
Supreme Court from ambassadors and most importantly states suing
other states. When that happens, they get a special master who
essentially functions as a district court judge to have a trial.
JUSTICE MORRIS FISH: But am I correct in assuming that the
Bagatz process involves a lawsuit against the government or some
government agency?
JUSTICE ELYAKIM RUBINSTEIN: It is a private party against
the government. The petitioners are arguing that some right was
violated by the government or one of its agencies.
PROFESSOR MALVINA HALBERSTAM: I just want to
emphasize, if I understand it correctly, that Israel is unique in this
respect, that anybody who thinks that anything was done wrong by the
government can simply go to the Supreme Court, bring a case and have
it heard at that time.
JUSTICE ELYAKIM RUBINSTEIN: Yes. I will just give you an
28
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example. Recently, during the Gaza operation (in December 2008January 2009), there were four petitions to the Court relating to the
military operations. By chance I sat on all four of them (the panel is
randomly decided). Like in other cases, there was a dialogue in the
courtroom between the government and the Court about whether some
of the government modes of behavior on a certain issue would be
modified or improved. Those petitions related to humanitarian supplies,
medical assistance, access to the media, and even the conduct of
elections in one of the Israeli towns adjacent to the Gaza area. So it’s
common practice.
JUSTICE MORRIS FISH: Just let me ask again who determines
the size and composition of the panels. When there’s a petition for
rehearing from three members, and as I understand it goes up to five or
seven or nine or eleven, who makes the decision as to who are the
members of the larger panel?
JUSTICE ELYAKIM RUBINSTEIN: In that rare case, it’s either
the President or the Deputy. It’s not random. The three original
Justices would be on and the additional Justices usually would be
designated by seniority, but the President or her Deputy would still have
discretion. In some rare cases it would be a larger panel from the
beginning.
PROFESSOR DANIEL FRIEDMANN: The problems that the
Supreme Court faces now result from the fact that originally the Israeli
Supreme Court was thought to be simply a Court of Appeal, and this
was its main function. There was the additional function inherited from
the British mandate of receiving direct applications against the
administration, but their number was relatively small. However, the
Court’s policy of expanding its jurisdiction and abolishing the standing
requirement has greatly increased the number of cases that the Supreme
Court is required to deal with. In other words, the Court developed
rules that greatly increase its load and it now complains about the
burden. By the way, the Minister of Justice is empowered to transfer
these kinds of direct applications to the district court sitting as an
administrative court and we do it usually only if the Supreme Court asks
us to do so. Yet, the Supreme Court wants to keep those cases that are
in the media, that attract attention and are important. It wants to keep
this original jurisdiction and we allow it to keep it. The burden that
ensues is the result of the Court’s policy.
A related matter is that the Israeli Supreme Court—which
originally was and still is a Court of Appeal—is trying to turn itself into
a constitutional court, and they look at the U.S. Supreme Court and the
Canadian Supreme Court with great envy and say well, we want to sit as
a panel of nine judges, we want to be able to select our cases and no
longer remain a Court of Appeal. That is what they want and they have
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been lobbying for it for a long time. But I think that on the political
level people see it differently and consider that one way to deal with the
burden is to appoint more Justices to the Supreme Court; but the
Justices on the Court object to it. They don’t want it. I think that
Minister Eitan when he chaired the committee in Parliament wanted to
increase the number of Supreme Court Justices. President Barak
resisted this very strongly. He said no, we don’t want more Justices; we
want less work. Eventually they reached a compromise of fifteen
Justices, which was already an increase in the number of Justices that
had been on the Court before. We started with five Justices when the
State of Israel was established, then the number was increased to nine.
Now we have fifteen Justices and I think Parliament would be willing to
increase the number further. The Court resists this strongly. The
current Justices do not want to have a Supreme Court based on the
continental model where you have many more Justices. They have the
American model in mind, and that’s one of the conflicts that we have.
Justice Rubinstein spoke about a Justice on Call. I look at this as a
“Justice without control.” What happens if the Court accepts thousands
of applications by applicants who have no standing and if everything is
justiciable? What kind of litigation is it and what is the effect of this
kind of litigation? This led to the situation that was described by Justice
Cheshin in the following words:
In an exaggerated way we can say that nowadays [when] a person
takes into his hands a newspaper . . . his eyes glance over the news
until his eye catches a particular item. Having found what he found
he calls upon his friends: Let us rise and go up to Zion—to the
Supreme Court. He speaks and acts. An application [is submitted]
as if written in the course of the trip [to Jerusalem] . . . .29

In the lines that follow, Justice Cheshin protests against such
applications that lack sufficient facts to sustain them. But applications
based mainly on facts publicized by the media are regularly submitted
to the Supreme Court and the policy adopted by the Court actually
encourages the practice. No costs are imposed on the applicant who
files a groundless petition in the “public interest.” From the applicant’s
point of view this is a win-win situation. Even if the petition is
dismissed it usually gets publicity—which more than compensates him
for his trouble.
Moreover, the Court gets the application and sometimes even if it
lacks sufficient basis the Court calls the government, as Justice
Rubinstein mentioned; the Court thus opens a dialogue with the
government. But this kind of “dialogue” is backed by a potential order
of the Court. In reality, the Court intervenes in the discretion of the
29 HCJ 2148/94 Gelbart v. Chairman of the Investigating Committee for the Examination of
the Massacre in Hebron [1994] IsrSC 48(3) 573, 600 (translation from Hebrew).
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executive and in the way the government is governing the country. The
Court is replacing the executive. So it is not only a technical issue. It is
a process that upsets the checks and balances between the branches of
government.
II. THE BASIS OF AND LIMITATIONS ON JUDICIAL REVIEW
PROFESSOR MALVINA HALBERSTAM: The next questions
concern the basis of and limitations on judicial review. First, is judicial
review based on the constitution, on legislation, or on a decision of the
Court? Second, are there limitations, such as standing, the political
question doctrine, or others?
A.

The United States

PROFESSOR MARCI HAMILTON: There’s a combination of
bases in the United States. There’s jurisdiction stated explicitly in
Article III of the Constitution, but there’s also, of course, Marbury v.
Madison, which is the Supreme Court decision that states that the
Supreme Court will have the last word on interpreting constitutional
provisions.30 Not that it will be the only body but it will have the last
word in interpreting constitutional provisions, which is, of course, a
rather large grab for power which has turned out to be pretty successful
for the Court. It is the last word in the United States even, for example,
when the question is who is the President of the United States.31 We
have a number of limitations that are placed on cases. Some of them
come out of what’s called the case or controversy requirement. The
Supreme Court and the federal courts are not permitted to issue advisory
opinions. There must be both a dispute and there must be individuals
who have standing. They can’t file just generalized grievances. They
must show they have some kind of interest at stake. They must show
that the Court can solve the problem; and there are both constitutional
and prudential reasons that keep cases out of federal court; and then
there is a requirement of ripeness. The issue must be ready for the
Court to hear. The Courts will not take cases, in the federal system at
least, until the dispute is sufficiently ripe or well developed so that the
Court can decide it based on facts as opposed to just bare theory.
Then there are limits that are related to keeping the dual
sovereignty of the federal government and the state government. One is
30
31

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).

2418

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:6

that federal courts will not decide issues solely based on state law as a
general matter and that means that the states must be the deciders of
most state law issues. That means the states continue to have the
primary role in the interpretation of state law. Federal courts will defer
to state courts on the interpretation of state law. So, if the U.S. Supreme
Court gets a case in which there is a pivotal state law question, the
Court will send it back to the state supreme court to tell it what the state
law means and then it will decide the federal aspects of the law.
Additionally, there’s the political question doctrine. For example, the
U.S. Constitution guarantees to the states a republican form of
government. This was just another element of the U.S. Constitution that
rejected direct democracy. The theory is that there are not supposed to
be direct democracies at either the state or federal level, but the
Supreme Court has refused to hear those cases saying they’re political
questions about the order of government that a state chooses and the
Court will not get involved. The result has been that we have had a
rather widespread development of direct democracy in certain states.
JUDGE RICHARD POSNER: Let me register a minor
disagreement with Professor Hamilton. I don’t think it’s correct that
Marbury v. Madison represented a power grab, a mere assertion of the
power of judicial review. That makes Chief Justice Marshall sound like
Chief Justice Barak. The Constitution says that the Constitution and
laws of the United States are the supreme law of the land, and that
means that the Constitution is law and it was already well established in
England and in the Colonies that if you have two conflicting laws and
one is hierarchically superior to the other, the higher preempts the lower
law. So if, for example, an act of Parliament was inconsistent with a
local law in England, then the local law was invalid; or if a Colonial law
was inconsistent with an act of Parliament, that local law was invalid.
Thus the Colonial courts and the English courts already were
invalidating laws. All this is explained in a great, recent book by Philip
Hamburger, a professor at Columbia Law School.32 What obscures
recognition of the point is that in the traditional British system, acts of
Parliament were regarded as part of the British Constitution. The
British Constitution isn’t a single document. It’s a collection. It
includes laws enacted by Parliament, along with the Magna Carta,
certain customs, and certain judicial decisions. Because acts of
Parliament were of constitutional dignity, the British courts could not
invalidate them. But the act of Parliament as a constitutional
undertaking corresponds to the U.S. Constitution. The U.S.
Constitution can be used to invalidate other laws, but what’s interesting
and emphasized by Professor Hamilton, is that the judiciary created by
32 PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY (2008); see also Richard A. Posner,
Modesty and Power, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 31, 2008, at 38 (reviewing Hamburger’s book).
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Article III of the Constitution is modeled very closely on the English
courts of the eighteenth century, and those courts conceived their
function as procedurally rather narrow. They just entertained cases.
They didn’t have “abstract review.” They thus weren’t anything like
the modern Israeli Supreme Court. While the U.S. Supreme Court has a
secure power to invalidate federal statutes as well as all sorts of
administrative and executive acts and state statutes and so on, there
must be something quite like a conventional litigation in order to
empower the Supreme Court to exercise its power of invalidation.
PROFESSOR MARCI HAMILTON: With respect to Judge
Posner’s point, I don’t think it’s inconsistent to say that the Supreme
Court was engaging in a grab for power. Whether it was history or not,
the U.S. Constitution did not explicitly give the power to the Court and
the Court took it.
B.

Canada

MR. IRWIN COTLER: In Canada, the power of judicial review
wasn’t solicited by the courts but imposed upon them—specifically, in
its modern iteration, by two provisions in our Constitution Act. Section
52 of the Act provides that “[t]he Constitution of Canada is the supreme
law of Canada, and any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of
the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or
effect.”33 In addition, there is a provision of the Charter of Rights—one
element of our Constitution and the equivalent of the Bill of Rights—
namely Section 24, which provides that “[a]nyone whose rights or
freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have been infringed or denied
may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as
the court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances.”34
Standing under Section 24 is thereby limited to a person whose rights
have been infringed.
PROFESSOR MALVINA HALBERSTAM: They’re all subject to
a standing requirement?
MR. IRWIN COTLER: Yes, but not Section 52. We have
developed a public interest doctrine, which means that when some
organization or body can demonstrate that there is a serious question as
to the validity of a law, that the organization is affected by or has a
legitimate interest in the law, and, furthermore, that the controversy
would not otherwise come before the court in the form of an
individual’s litigation, then the court can assume jurisdiction to hear it.
33
34

Constitution Act, 1982, § 52(1), being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.).
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
§ 24(1), being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.).
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The constitutionalization of judicial review in terms of rights
protection began with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. It had
existed previously under the rubric of federalism, the allocation of
power between the federal government and the provinces. That was
what might be called the powers process. The advent of the Charter
gave us the rights process, and that’s when rights protection became
constitutionalized. In that vein, we just had a very important decision
that came down on the issue of political questions in a case in which I
was involved, the Khadr case.35
In Khadr, issues of justiciability and standing were dramatically
enhanced by the constitutionalization of rights protection under the
Charter. Ironically, in Israel, even without constitutionalization, you
had the notion that everything was justiciable. We in Canada, even with
constitutionalization, did not have the notion that everything is
justiciable. Another example of the development of this notion in
Canada was the issue of same-sex marriage, which could not have
arisen before the Charter existed. It would not have been seen to be
justiciable, nor would anyone have had standing to bring the matter
before the courts. Because of the constitutionalization of rights
protection with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, it became
justiciable as an issue and opened up the question of standing. But I’ll
deal with this later.36
JUSTICE MORRIS FISH: Just a note regarding justiciability:
Canada has largely rejected the political question doctrine. This
approach provides that the courts should choose not to entertain certain
disputes whose subject matter is better resolved through the political
process. Our Court’s most explicit discussion of the doctrine is found in
Justice Wilson’s concurrence in Operation Dismantle.37 There, Justice
Wilson held that it was inappropriate for the Court to decline
jurisdiction over matters with political consequences, so long as the
question raised before the Court is a genuinely legal one.
The doctrine still has some life in Canadian jurisprudence,
however. The Court will still refuse to hear cases that do not have a
cognizable legal content, or cases that involve disputes that Parliament
intended to be resolved through the political process. What Canadian
courts generally will not do, however, is to decline to hear a case for the
prudential reason that resolving the legal issues at stake would have
political consequences.
A case I mentioned earlier, the Secession Reference,38 touched on
35 Canada (Justice) v. Khadr, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 125
http://csc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/2008/2008scc28/2008scc28.html.
36 See infra Part IV.C.
37 Operation Dismantle v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441 (Can.).
38 Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.).
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the political question issue. In that case, interveners urged the Court not
to answer the questions posed on the ground that they were
nonjusticiable political questions. The Court determined that, in
general, reference questions were justiciable unless answering them
“would take the Court beyond its own assessment of its proper role in
the constitutional framework” or “if the Court could not give an answer
that lies within its area of expertise: the interpretation of law.”39 The
Court noted that the issues raised on the reference combined difficult
legal and constitutional questions with complex political questions. The
Court determined that it was appropriate for the Court to address the
legal issues, which did no more than set the framework within which
political decisions were to be taken.
In the recent Same-Sex Marriage Reference,40 the Court was
thought by some to have departed from the rule that it will decide
questions that have sufficient legal content, irrespective of prudential
considerations.
The fourth question posed in the reference was whether the old law
defining marriage as between people of the opposite sex was
unconstitutional. The Court declined to answer that question because of
the unique circumstances in which it was submitted to the Court. In
particular, the Court pointed to (1) the fact that the government planned
to proceed with the proposed equal marriage legislation irrespective of
the Court’s decision and (2) the fact that the reference question was
identical to the issue that would have been raised had the government
chosen to appeal the various decisions of the courts of appeal striking
down the old definition of marriage. Moreover, prior to the arrival of
the reference at the Supreme Court, four provincial courts of appeal
(Yukon, Manitoba, Nova Scotia, and Saskatchewan) had already ruled
that the opposite-sex requirement for marriage was unconstitutional.41
C.

Israel

MINISTER MICHAEL EITAN: The basis of judicial review is
legislation. In 1995, the Supreme Court held in the United Mizrahi
case42 that the Knesset, in enacting the Basic Law of Human Dignity
and Liberty43 three years earlier, established a formal constitution for
the State of Israel. By declaring that, the Supreme Court laid the
39
40
41
42

Id.
Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698 (Can.).
See Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698, at para. 66 (Can.).
CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Coop. Vill. [1995] IsrSC 49(4) 221,
available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/93/210/068/z01/93068210.z01.htm.
43 Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 1992, S.H. 150.
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foundations for its prerogative to conduct substantive judicial review of
Knesset legislation. I would like to refer to what Justice Barak said a
few months after the adoption of this legislation. He remarked, “the
new legislation passed by the Knesset limits the Knesset and
subordinates it to the fundamental principles. From this point on the
Court cannot only interpret a statute that is contrary to the fundamental
principles, it can also nullify it.”44 In doing so, Barak says, “the people
have given its judges a powerful tool. Now that the people have given
us tools, we shall do the work.”45 I’m sorry; I was in the Knesset in
1992. I clashed with the Chairman of the Constitution, Law and Justice
Committee when he brought the law to the final reading and I can
testify personally that the word “constitution” was not mentioned by
anyone of the members of the Knesset. Ninety-five percent of them
never thought that they had a constitutional power. It’s the first time I
hear that a country can get a constitution retroactively. At the time of
the legislation, the members of the Knesset did not know that they were
adopting a constitution for the State of Israel, nor did anyone else. How
do I know? In the newspapers the day after the enactment of the law,
no one mentioned it. It came to our knowledge that we made the
constitution a few months later, when Barak said the words I quoted, in
a speech and later in an article. But, no one contemplated it at the time
the law was enacted. So, what is the basis for the declaration of the
constitution? In one judgment the Supreme Court combined two errors:
declaring that we have a constitution and that from this day on the Court
is also going to have the jurisdiction to nullify laws of the Israeli
Knesset. I’m sure this is one of the brilliant maneuvers of judicial
activism.
DR. JANICE SOKOLOVSKY46: My comments refer to the easy
access of political non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to the
Israeli Supreme Court via the Bagatz procedure, in which the Court sits
as a High Court of Justice. The Judiciary Statute grants the Court very
broad powers in these cases, in particular the power to order any public
official “to do or refrain from doing any act [with]in the lawful exercise
of [his] functions” for the sake of justice.47 Access to the Bagatz is
today completely open. Since there is no need for standing, anyone
who sees injustice in any act by any public official, whether or not he
personally is affected by that act, can file a petition for redress.
Political advocacy NGOs file Bagatz petitions challenging critical

44 Aharon Barak, The Constitutional Revolution: Protected Human Rights, 1 MISHPAT
UMIMSHAL [LAW & GOV’T] 9, 34 (1992) (Isr.) (Hebrew).
45 Id.
46 Dr. Sokolovsky is a member of the bar both in the United States and in Israel, where she
has lived for the past twenty-three years.
47 Basic Law: The Judiciary, § 15(d)(2), 1984, S.H. 78.
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policy or political issues that are not to their liking. Should they have
standing to file Bagatzim? There are now about twenty NGOs that
regularly file such actions. They also lobby, prepare well-publicized
reports on political issues, and receive permits for highly controversial
demonstrations on political issues. Some are not even registered in
Israel, and many are heavily funded by foreign governments,
particularly European governments. In the United States, under the
Foreign Agents Registration Act,48 such foreign-funded organizations
would be required to register and identify themselves as agents of the
funding foreign governments with respect to any political activity in
which they engage, such as lobbying, or on any material they
disseminate. And of course, they would not be able to file political
petitions in the U.S. Supreme Court without standing.
PROFESSOR SHLOMO SLONIM49: I sympathize with Minister
Eitan’s position that the Israeli Supreme Court took the law of Human
Dignity and Liberty and ran away with it and established judicial
review, but in a certain sense it was an open invitation. In speaking to
people who were involved in the legislation, they seem to have
recognized at the time that there would be some form of judicial review,
perhaps not as extensive, not as broad as what we have today, but it was
very clear that the Court was going to do something. However, having
said that, we must also recognize that there are serious problems about
the basis of judicial review in Israel. Where did the Knesset obtain the
authority to pass a law, which is considered to be a Basic Law? In the
United Mizrahi case, there were two opinions that were expressed, one
by Chief Justice Shamgar and the other by Justice Barak. Shamgar held
that the Knesset was sovereign and had power to create a Basic Law of
this nature. Justice Barak said that the original Knesset was a
constituent assembly empowered to formulate a constitution, that this
power of being a constituent assembly was passed on to each of the
subsequent Knessets, and that they were, therefore, able to adopt the
Basic Laws.
Both of these theses are problematic. The most important problem
is that the public has no say in the matter. Bear in mind that this law on
Human Dignity and Liberty was adopted not by a majority of the
Knesset, but by a majority of those present. Out of the entire Knesset,
composed of 120 members, 32 voted in favor of the law—so there was
no true majority that supported this. It is, I think, incumbent on any
fundamental change in a constitution that the public be consulted. It’s
interesting that in the United States, James Madison, known as the
father of the Constitution, maintained that all the state constitutions
48
49

22 U.S.C. §§ 611-621 (2006).
James G. McDonald Professor (Emeritus) of American History, The Hebrew University of
Jerusalem.
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were in fact invalid at that time when they were adopted in 1776 and
subsequently since they were never presented to the public for
ratification. It was only subsequently, when they received ratification
by the public, that they were in a certain sense in his eyes validated.
That is what is unique about the Constitution and the Bill of Rights of
the United States, that the Constitution was ratified by the minimal
number of nine states, as stipulated in the Constitution, and the Bill of
Rights was adopted and ratified by a two-thirds majority of the state
legislatures; so you have the involvement of the people in the process of
endorsing a Constitution in the United States, something which,
unfortunately, has been entirely lacking in the Israeli experience. In any
thought of confirming judicial review and in making it a permanent part
of the Israeli Constitution, it would be desirable if some consultation
with the general populace would be undertaken.
JUSTICE ELYAKIM RUBINSTEIN: I was quite—I wouldn’t say
surprised—but saddened by what Minister Eitan was saying, because
whoever reads the text of the two Basic Laws that have been the basis
of the Israeli equivalent of Marbury v. Madison, called United Mizrahi
Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Cooperative Village,50 decided in 1995, can
identify that they include a constitutional power of judicial review, even
if it is not stated explicitly, just as happened with the U.S. Constitution.
The text, in my view, is clear. You just have to read the limitation
clause. On June 13, 1950, two years after our independence, the
Knesset decided that instead of promulgating a full-fledged constitution,
we should enact Basic Laws, that would finally be incorporated into a
constitution. The first nine Basic Laws were mainly on government
branches—legislative, executive, judicial—as well as on Jerusalem as
our capital. The last two, enacted in 1992, are Human Dignity and
Liberty and the Freedom of Occupation.51 The limitation clause says,
“There shall be no violation of rights under this Basic Law except by a
law befitting the values of the State of Israel, enacted for a proper
purpose, and to an extent no greater than is required.”52 What does that
mean in simple words for any jurist, with all due respect to the Knesset?
It means that laws could be examined through the lenses of the
limitation clause. I would have definitely preferred that what Professor
Slonim said, that the constitutional laws should be accepted in a
ceremonial way, would have materialized. I agree with him on that.
But this is not what happened, and the two Basic Laws on human and
civil rights were accepted. What do you do? Obviously, they must be
applied and interpreted. Who interprets any law? This is the role of the
50
51

CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank.
Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 1992, S.H. 150; Basic Law: Freedom of
Occupation, 1992 S.H. 114.
52 Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty § 8, 1992, S.H. 150.
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Court. And if a law affects rights and is not in conformity with the
Basic Laws, it cannot stand. Here is the foundation of judicial review.
The Knesset wrote it into a legal text, a constitutional law, a Basic Law.
Who is going to interpret it? It’s the court of law. While I can argue
with this or that decision of President Barak, a great jurist, I would
never agree with what Judge Posner said about usurpation. Judicial
review was accepted in the United Mizrahi case by a nine-Justice panel,
including retiring President Shamgar, who is not known necessarily as
an “activist,” and President Barak, who was just coming in as President.
My bottom line is simple: The Knesset may not have thought of it
in constitutional terms the way it should have, but what it gave us, what
it produced, is a constitutional text. And when it produced a
constitutional text, which clearly refers to the examination of laws per
their content, judicial review, which has had origins even before, was
definitely proclaimed—not by the Court, but by the Knesset.
PROFESSOR MALVINA HALBERSTAM: If I understood
Professor Slonim, he was saying the Knesset didn’t have the authority to
create constitutional values. You’re saying the Knesset did?
MINISTER MICHAEL EITAN: I’m an eye witness that none of
the Knesset members exercised any constitutional power. There was
one member who was shouting that it is usurpation. “You take power
illegitimately from the Knesset and transfer it to the Supreme Court.”
Uriel Linn—then-Chairman of the Constitution, Law and Justice
Committee and the member who brought the bill—replied, “We are not
transferring the balance of power to the Supreme Court. No
constitutional authority is established. Nor does it establish a special
constitutional court that is given special power to newly filed statutes.”
And later on the Chairman, to convince the members of the Knesset,
said again, “Power will not be transferred to the Court. The power will
remain in this House.”53 You have to understand that the Basic Law
until that point was an ordinary law, it had no superiority. People
looked at this as a declaration, not as something substantive. That’s
why the majority of the Knesset members didn’t bother to come to
debate or vote on it.
The Chairman of the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee
welcomed the law and voted for it at the second and third (final)
readings, even though he objected to the establishment of a
constitutional court because he thought that doing so would give far too
much power to a small group of judges whose interpretation would
invalidate statutes, and he convinced the member of the Knesset that
this statute would not do that. That’s what he said a few minutes before
the vote. Three years later in his opinion in the United Mizrahi case,
53 These statements are from debates during Plenum No. 398 of the 12th Knesset, as reported
by Minister Michael Eitan.
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Justice Barak described these comments as supporting the idea that “the
Basic Law is part of the State constitution.”54 What is this?
III. LIMITATIONS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
PROFESSOR MALVINA HALBERSTAM: What I would like to
do now is discuss cases that panel members think should not have been
decided by the Court or in which the Court’s assertion of jurisdiction
was particularly controversial. This is, of course, especially true in
Israel, but there may be other cases that panelists want to raise in that
connection for the United States and Canada as well. Judge Posner, did
you want to discuss some cases? You raised some in an article that you
wrote regarding the Israeli Supreme Court which you thought went
beyond what courts normally decide or should decide.
A.

Cases in the United States

JUDGE RICHARD POSNER: Sure, I’ll say a few words, except
that I do want to make clear that I’m not an expert on the Israeli
political or judicial systems, and I’m reluctant to talk about foreign
judiciaries about which I know very little. Justice Barak—in a book
which I reviewed critically55—did not purport to be speaking just about
Israel. He was laying down what he considered to be universal
principles of proper adjudication and the proper scope of judicial power,
and I disagree with his conception as a general matter. Maybe it’s
something Israel needs, although I’m very impressed by the statements
by Mr. Eitan and Professors Slonim and Friedmann, criticizing those
views in the Israeli context. But I don’t like to say that a specific Israeli
decision is wrong, because it arises in a political context and a juridical
context that is pretty alien to my understanding.
One could divide Professor Halberstam’s question into two.
There’s a question concerning cases in which the Supreme Court has
exceeded its jurisdiction, in the sense of not honoring these principles of
standing, ripeness, and so on that are basic to the Anglo-American
judicial tradition. And then there are cases that are just mistaken
decisions or reckless decisions.
PROFESSOR MALVINA HALBERSTAM: You mean
substantively mistaken?

54
55
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Richard A. Posner, Enlightened Despot, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 23, 2007, at 53 (reviewing
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JUDGE RICHARD POSNER: Substantively mistaken, but I take it
you’re not interested in those.
PROFESSOR MALVINA HALBERSTAM: No, but I think that
there may be some cases, even beyond the standing and political
question doctrine, which are just beyond what a court should do.
JUDGE RICHARD POSNER: One example would be the standing
issue that was presented in Roe v. Wade56 because human beings do not
have the same gestation period as elephants. It’s really hard to litigate
an abortion case to judgment in nine months, or in six months if you
discovered you were pregnant after three months. So the Supreme
Court created a doctrine that if a case is capable of repetition but evades
review because the individual case will become moot before it can be
decided, still there is standing. So the woman who seeks an abortion
and might become pregnant in the future and want another one is
permitted to litigate her right to abort the first pregnancy even if she’s
already given birth to the child. I think that’s mistaken actually. I think
the standing requirement should be enforced very rigorously. That
would not have precluded a challenge to the abortion laws, but it would
have had to be a challenge by an abortion clinic or by a doctor who was
prosecuted for violating laws against abortion, and that I think is
significant because we really want—it sounds cruel—but we really want
people to pay a price in order to sue, to subject themselves to a risk of
prosecution or the actuality of prosecution before they can get into
court, because it’s very important to limit access to the courts.
Listening to Justice Rubinstein about the 11,000 cases reviewed in
the Israeli Supreme Court each year, the United States has roughly fifty
times the population of Israel. So imagine 550,000 cases being
submitted directly to the nine Supreme Court Justices. You’d need
hundreds of Supreme Court Justices.
It’s a strange thing about government, but you can’t scale up every
level of government to adjust to changes in population. You can’t have
hundreds of Supreme Court Justices even if you have 300 million
people in your country. You can’t have dozens of Presidents even
though you have an immense population. So you need to have elaborate
structures for screening. It’s like the brontosaurus with the tiny head.
Other cases that strain the concept of standing involve the
exception to standing that allows an individual federal taxpayer to
challenge a congressional appropriation for religion. If the United
States decided to make Islam the official religion of the United States
and appropriated money to build mosques, taxpayers would be allowed
to challenge that as a violation of the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. But it wouldn’t really be legitimate from a standing point
56

410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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of view because the harm to the individual taxpayer from a particular
appropriation is negligible. The exception is a rule that’s been adopted
in order to permit certain types of legal issues—which happen, in the
establishment context, to be very controversial—to be litigated.
PROFESSOR MALVINA HALBERSTAM: Implicit in what you
are saying is that you think standing is a desirable limitation. Would
you like to say a little about that?
JUDGE RICHARD POSNER: Yes, and I’ll give an example of a
case—the Newdow case.57 The Ninth Circuit, which is the most liberal
federal court of appeals, held that the phrase “under God” in the Pledge
of Allegiance was unconstitutional. It struck God from the Pledge of
Allegiance, causing a scandal, but since it was just applicable in the
western states that comprise the Ninth Circuit, it wasn’t cataclysmic.
But it was appealed to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court in an
implausible opinion by Justice Stevens ruled that there was no standing
to challenge the “under God” provision because the person who brought
the case, Mr. Newdow, was the father of the child who was being forced
to say “under God” in her public school and he didn’t have custody of
her (he was divorced from her mother). Justice Stevens is not a big
standing buff. So it was an inauthentic decision and I think just
reflected the fact that the Supreme Court did not want to be accused of
removing God from the Pledge of Allegiance. It’s a real strength of the
Supreme Court that it has all sorts of ways of ducking controversial
issues. And the most important thing really is not the little tricks played
in a case like Newdow but the fact that you can’t even get into the
Supreme Court without a case. And a case takes a long time to get to
the Supreme Court, so that the Supreme Court doesn’t have to intervene
and maybe invalidate some very popular law for years. By the time the
case finally gets to the Supreme Court, the popularity of the law may
have waned, or the circumstances may show that as it’s actually
administered it’s not as bad as it seemed when it was enacted.
So our system—I’m not saying it’s the right system for every
country, but it has enabled the Supreme Court to be powerful but also to
be restrained so that it fits our constitutional conception of a balance of
powers. We don’t want any branch to be all powerful. It’s been a
successful balancing process.
PROFESSOR MALVINA HALBERSTAM: Mr. Lewin, do you
want to add either American or Israeli cases that you want to comment
on?
NATHAN LEWIN: Sure. Let me say preliminarily that it seems to
me that there is a significant difference between the things that we were
discussing earlier, which is the assumption of power on the part of the
57
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Supreme Court to declare certain acts of the Knesset illegal unless the
Knesset re-enacts those over the rulings of the Supreme Court. By
comparison, in the United States, judicial supremacy controls regardless
of what Congress thinks. My colleague here, Professor Hamilton, was
successful in persuading the Supreme Court to declare unconstitutional
an act of Congress that was enacted unanimously.58 Congress did not
have a single dissenting vote when it enacted a law that said that
religious freedom should be protected even after Justice Scalia wrote an
opinion under the Free Exercise Clause that really eliminated protection
for religious observance against neutral standards. Had Congress had
the power that the Knesset has to overrule what the Supreme Court said,
I think, given that it voted unanimously for that law, Congress would
probably have overruled the Supreme Court. So, I am not as troubled
by the notion that a Supreme Court can say an act of the legislature is
presumptively contrary to some very basic principles on which the
country stands. I think probably in the British system that’s permissible
even in the absence of a written constitution, and it doesn’t offend me
so much.
On the other hand, what does offend me in terms of the decisions
of the Barak Court are areas that the Barak Court and the Israeli
Supreme Court have gone into which to an American lawyer are
bizarre. There’s been a lot of things in the press, for example, about the
criminal prosecution of a former president of Israel, Mr. Katzav, and the
Israeli Supreme Court vacated a plea agreement entered between him
and the prosecutor. That a decision by a prosecutor to enter into a
disposition of a criminal case with the defendant should be subject to
court review I find bizarre. U.S. prosecutors are given broad power to
conclude dispositions under which people plead guilty. There’s a
reduced sentence and unless there’s some extreme reason such as
bribery of the prosecutor, the courts have no business going into that.
The Israeli Supreme Court actually enforces political agreements
between parties in election campaigns. There are written agreements,
and there have been cases by the Israeli Supreme Court in which such
agreements are treated, subject to certain reservations, almost as if they
were contracts between private parties.59 If there’s ever a political
question, I would think that an agreement between two political parties
regarding how ministries should be divided up or other things is not
enforceable in the courts and should not be reviewed by the courts. The
Israeli Supreme Court has invalidated appointments; the Ginossar case60
invalidated an appointment because the Supreme Court decided that the
person who was appointed was just not appropriate for that particular
58
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City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
E.g., HCJ 1635/90 Zerzewsky v. Prime Minister [1991] IsrSC 45(1) 749.
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position. That’s not a function of courts. These are all questions, which
I think are plainly nonjusticiable because courts have no business
getting into those areas. And yet the Israeli Supreme Court has gotten
into it with Justice Barak.
There are other areas that the Court has gotten into after it resisted
doing so for a long time on standing grounds. For example, deciding
whether exemptions for Yeshiva students from the military was, I think,
rejected three times on the ground that the person who brought the
lawsuit had no standing. Finally, Justice Barak in a leading case, the
Ressler case,61 said, “no, I don’t like standing. There’s no reason why
the court shouldn’t look into it,” and it found a basis for entertaining
that lawsuit. I think in the United States we could have found parties
that could have brought that to court and satisfied the standards for
standing so that the decision on the merits, which ultimately sustained
the exemption for Yeshiva students, could have been reached in the
United States.
Let me just very briefly tell you about a very particular case
involving standing and justiciability that I am litigating. I am presently
in the middle of a lawsuit that involves exactly these issues of standing
and justiciability.62 The Department of State of the United States has
refused to allow American citizens born in Jerusalem to have “Israel”
on their passports. They say the passport can only say “Jerusalem.” It
can’t say “Israel.” Congress passes a law and tells the Secretary of
State you have to say “Israel” for any American citizen born in
Jerusalem who wants his passport to say “Israel.” We bring a lawsuit
based on the congressional statute. Along comes a district court and
sustains the government’s motion to dismiss the case on the ground that
there’s no standing on the part of our client, the youngest client of our
firm. He’s now six years old. We brought this lawsuit six years ago
when he was two months old. The district court says no standing. He
has a perfectly valid passport. He doesn’t have standing. That’s a
misuse of the standing principle. We take it up to the court of appeals.
The court of appeals says the district judge was wrong on standing.
There is standing because Congress said his passport should say
“Israel.” They reverse it and send it back to the district judge. This
time the district judge dismisses it on the ground that it’s a political
question.
We say it’s not a political question. Congress has enacted a statute
that says that the passport should say “Israel.” The case is now before

61 HCJ 910/86 Ressler v. Minister of Def. [1988] IsrSC 42(2) 441, available at
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/86/100/009/Z01/86009100.z01.pdf.
62 Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State, 571 F.3d 1227 (D.C. Cir. 2009), reh’g denied, No. 07-5347,
2010 WL 2572934 (D.C. Cir. June 29, 2010) (en banc).
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the court of appeals.63
In my view, these are instances of misuse of standing and
justiciability in the United States.
B.

Cases in Israel

PROFESSOR SHLOMO SLONIM: Judicial review, the power of a
court to declare the actions of a legislature or executive
unconstitutional, is an American invention that, in the words of the
noted American historian, Charles Beard, constitutes “the most unique
contribution to the science of government which has been made by
American political genius.”64 It has earned widespread global respect
and admiration and has been increasingly adopted in recent decades by
other democratic regimes, including Israel. That Israel has adopted
judicial review is, on its face, puzzling on several counts. Israel has no
formal written document that can be labeled a constitution; Israel’s
legislative body, the Knesset, like its British model, controls the
jurisdiction of the courts; and no Act of the Knesset has expressly
endowed the Court with the necessary competence.
Supporters of judicial review point to two Basic Laws enacted in
1992—Human Dignity and Liberty, and Freedom of Occupation65—as
acts that implicitly guarantee human rights and entitle an injured party
to have recourse to judicial remedies, including a declaration that
legislative or executive action is unconstitutional. Critics have felt that
the Court was too self-aggrandizing, and they have sought occasionally
to narrow the scope of judicial review. Most notably, this occurred in
2008, when Professor Daniel Friedmann, then-Minister of Justice,
proposed restrictive legislation that aroused the ire of the Supreme
Court Justices.
To understand how differently judicial review is applied today in
the United States and in Israel, it is instructive to examine judicial
approaches to such matters as standing to sue and justiciability; the
handling of national security matters, especially in the context of an
ongoing conflict; and intervention in the internal operation of the
legislature or the executive.
The U.S. Supreme Court’s power of judicial review derives from
no specific constitutional grant. But very early on, the Court assumed
the power to have the final say about the validity of the acts of the other,
63
64

Id.
CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 162 (1913).
65 Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 1992, S.H. 150; Basic Law: Freedom of
Occupation, 1992 S.H. 114.
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theoretically co-equal, branches of government in the separation-ofpowers governmental system. The Court instituted a doctrine of selfrestraint, most notably by adopting the political question doctrine. The
principle was already enunciated by Chief Justice John Marshall in
Marbury v. Madison, the case that established the power of judicial
review. Marshall said: “Questions, in their nature political, . . . can
never be made in this court.”66
The Israeli governmental framework is quite different. Like the
British Parliament, the Knesset was, in theory, subject to no restriction
on its legislative capacity. The Israeli Supreme Court exercises
jurisdiction in two capacities: as a Court of Appeal in all cases dealt
with by the lower courts, and as the High Court of Justice, where it rules
as a court of first and last instance on any administrative or
constitutional question brought before it “in the interests of justice.” It
is in the latter capacity that the Court has instituted a virtual revolution
in the constitutional framework of the State, evoking thereby a powerful
reaction in the other two branches of the government to rein in the
judiciary.
1.

Standing to Sue and Justiciability

For Israel, in the initial decades, standing was basically on par with
the American pattern. Thus, in a 1971 case, Justice Sussman ruled:
We will not hear the petition of a man complaining that the authority
acted illegally, if he cannot show why he and no one else should
request the correction of the irregularity. For it must be emphasized
that the Court is not competent to stand guard over the observance of
the law and the prevention of injustice in general. This is not the
task of the judge.67

In order to understand how the reach of the Court has extended so
far that practically everything is justiciable and virtually everyone has
standing to sue, it is necessary to trace one source of jurisdiction that is
uniquely available to the Israeli Supreme Court. In addition to
exercising appellate jurisdiction over lower courts, the Supreme Court
excercises original jurisdiction as the High Court of Justice to rule on
administrative and constitutional questions.
For some forty years the Supreme Court employed this jurisdiction
rather sparingly, and only in the more egregious cases did it intervene to
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5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803).
Ass’n of Life Ins. Cos. v. Minister of Fin. [1971] IsrSC 26(1) 230, 234, cited in Stephen
Goldstein, Protection of Human Rights by Judges: The Israeli Experience, 38 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
605, 613-14 (1994).
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administer justice. Standing was limited by the generally accepted
standard requiring evidence of injury.
With the entry of Justice Aharon Barak to the Supreme Court, and
particularly after he became President of the Court in 1995, the
jurisdiction of the High Court of Justice was vastly expanded, both by
eliminating practically every restriction on standing and by the adoption
of a policy of activism designed to promote greater “democracy” in
Israel. The Court, in Barak’s view, was to serve as the guardian of
justice and morality in Israeli society. The standard by which these
values were to be defined and assessed were those of the majority of the
Court. This approach represented an extraordinary innovation for the
role of a court and exceeded the pattern prevalent in Western
democratic states. It constituted an assumption of competence that was
never bestowed on the Court by the Knesset, nor sanctioned in any way
by public acclamation or plebiscite.
2.

Judicial Directions to the Military in an Ongoing Conflict

The basic approach of the U.S. Supreme Court regarding judicial
intervention in an ongoing conflict is reflected in the 1950 case of
Johnson v. Eisentrager, where even dissenting Justice Hugo Black
declared:
It has always been recognized that actual warfare can be conducted
successfully only if those in command are left the most ample
independence in the theatre of operations. Our Constitution is not so
impractical or inflexible that it unduly restricts such necessary
independence. It would be fantastic to suggest that alien enemies
could hail our military leaders into judicial tribunals to account for
their day-to-day activities on the battlefront. Active fighting forces
must be free to fight while hostilities are in progress.68

More recent decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, while they
extended rights, such as habeas corpus, to prisoners held in
Guantanamo, have in no way modified the basic principle enunciated by
Justice Black that American courts do not presume to intervene and
issue directives to fighting forces in an ongoing conflict. As one writer
has said:
In the United States, it would have been unthinkable for the Supreme
Court to intervene in the military strategy of American forces in Iraq
or Afghanistan. . . . [A] strong commitment to separation of powers
(manifested, in part, through the doctrines of justiciability or political

68

Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 796 (1950).
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questions), would have made any review of such operations highly
improbable.69

In Israel, in stark contrast, judicial intervention in military affairs
during the course of an actual conflict has been far from rare. Ever
since the Israeli Supreme Court adopted the position that everything is
justiciable and practically everyone has standing, the Court has become
a forum in which contesting parties vie to extract directives from the
Court regarding the conduct of the organs charged with national
security. The Court has deemed itself qualified, indeed obligated, to
issue orders regarding ongoing military operations. Thus, during
Operation “Defensive Shield” in April 2002 in Judea and Samaria
following the terrorist Passover Seder massacre, the Court intervened
with respect to several military decisions, including the fighting in Jenin
and the army siege of the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem in which
Palestinian terrorists had taken refuge. A vivid illustration of the
Court’s new role was provided by the Rafah case, decided on May 30,
2004.70 The judgment by Court President Aharon Barak, on behalf of
the three-Justice panel, noted that combat activities by the Israeli
Defense Forces (IDF) had been going on in Rafah since May 18, i.e., for
twelve days. Rafah is located in the Gaza Strip, and the military action
was designed to arrest terrorists operating in the area, to locate arms
caches, and destroy tunnels used to smuggle in arms and weapons from
Egypt to Gaza. The suit before the Court was instituted by B’Tselem
and several other Israeli NGOs active in the field of human rights. They
petitioned the Court to order the IDF to facilitate the entry of medical
teams and ambulances into Gaza to treat wounded civilians; to restore
damaged water and electricity supplies; to allow provision of food and
water for the residents of Rafah; to investigate an incident in which
civilians were killed by shellfire; and to allow civilians to attend the
funerals of their deceased relatives.
In his opening remarks, Barak stressed that the Court would not
interfere in the midst of actual combat when the lives of soldiers are at
stake. But he did not consider that the present situation was of such a
nature, and he went on to declare: “Israel is not an isolated island. She
is a member of an international system. . . . There are legal norms—of
customary international law, of treaties to which Israel is [a] party, and
of the fundamental principles of Israeli law—which set out how military
69 See Gabriella Blum, Judicial Review of Counterterrorism Operations, JUSTICE, Spring
2010, at 17, 19, available at http://www.intjewishlawyers.org/main/files/Justice_all11_3bfinal.pdf. See also, in this regard, the dissenting opinion of Justice Scalia, to which Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Thomas subscribed, in Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
70 HCJ 4764/04 Physicians for Human Rights et al. v. Commander of the IDF Forces in the
Gaza Strip [2004] IsrSC 58(5) 385, reproduced in JUDGMENTS OF THE ISRAEL SUPREME COURT:
FIGHTING
TERRORISM
WITHIN
THE
LAW
182
(2005),
available
at
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Politics/terrorirm_law.pdf.
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operations should be conducted.”71 On the role of the judiciary, he
stated:
We do not review the wisdom of the decision to take military action.
We review the legality of the military operations. . . . The question
before us is only whether these military operations adhere to
domestic and international law. . . . We examine the legal import of
[the military] decisions. That is our expertise.72

The IDF, Barak said, “must act with integrity . . . , with reasonableness
and proportionality, and appropriately balance individual liberty and the
public interest.”73
It is to be noted that in advance of the engagement, the IDF had
taken steps to minimize any harm or injury to civilians. A “hotline” to
resolve urgent humanitarian problems was set up; an officer was
designated to maintain contact with the Red Cross and Palestinian
hospitals; and a liaison officer was stationed with every battalion to
attend to humanitarian needs among the civilians and the evacuation of
the injured.
The Court stressed that it was incumbent on the army to refrain
from operations that might entail civilian casualties even in the search
for terrorists who are integrated in the civilian population. Given this
basic principle, even though the military campaign was still in
operation, the Court ruled that the army had to allow convoys to bring
in food and water, to make provision for the evacuation of the wounded,
and to allow civilians to attend the funerals of relatives as an
accommodation for the dignity of the dead. All of this judicial activity
occurred while military operations were being pursued.
Although the IDF had striven to avoid harming civilians, and had
even permitted supplies to reach areas in the combat zone, the Court had
deemed these measures insufficient, and had substituted its own, far
more stringent standards of necessity and proportionality for those of
the military. Any disruption of normal civilian life had to be justified
by these standards, notwithstanding the fact that terrorists exploited
Israeli leniency in order to launch attacks against Israeli forces and
civilians.
It is clear that the Israeli Supreme Court’s position during Israel’s
current sustained and ongoing conflict differs markedly from that
enunciated by Justice Black in the Eisentrager case, and from the
restrictive operative doctrines, even today, of the U.S. Supreme Court.
But Israel’s domestic and international position is far more difficult than
that of the United States, and the Court therefore feels compelled to
71 Id., reproduced in JUDGMENTS OF THE ISRAEL SUPREME COURT, supra note 70, at 185
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
72 Id., reproduced in JUDGMENTS OF THE ISRAEL SUPREME COURT, supra note 70, at 187.
73 Id.
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engage in a delicate balancing act. On the one hand, Justice Barak has
stressed that “this Court will take no position regarding the manner in
which combat is being conducted. As long as soldiers’ lives are in
danger, these decisions will be made by the commanders.”74
Nevertheless, it would be difficult to conclude that judicial intervention
does not impinge on the freedom of action and movement of military
forces. But counterbalancing this is the conviction that the Supreme
Court’s intervention shields Israel from much foreign criticism and its
ministers and commanders from subjection to criminal prosecution
before the International Criminal Court and before the judicial tribunals
of states invoking universal jurisdiction to try violations of international
criminal law. The infamous Goldstone Report, however, underscores
the fact that even strict supervision of military actions by the Israeli
judiciary organs, including the Supreme Court, cannot be relied on to
deflect harsh and unjustified criticism of Israel’s self-defensive
measures against an unrelenting terrorist foe, whose actions defy all the
norms of international humanitarian law.
3.

Judicial Review of Parliamentary Proceedings

In the United States, the Supreme Court studiously avoids
becoming embroiled in the internal affairs of either the legislature or the
executive. Such restraint contrasts with the attitude of the Israeli
Supreme Court in recent years in relation to the other two branches of
government, in accordance with its generally expansive notion of
justiciability.
Thus, in the 1981 case of Sarid v. Chairman of the Knesset, the
Court undertook to investigate a decision of the Speaker to schedule a
motion of no-confidence at 5 P.M. rather than at 11 A.M., the usual
hour for such motions.75 The applicant, an opposition member of the
Knesset, charged that the hearing of the motion was postponed so as to
allow absent government members to return in time for the vote. The
Court declined to act in this case, but the decision to accept the case and
investigate set a pattern for subsequent interventions in the affairs of the
Parliament. In the 1981 case of Flatto-Sharon v. Knesset Committee,
the Court disallowed an attempt by a Knesset committee to deny a
member of the Knesset whose appeal against a criminal conviction was
74 HCJ 3114/02 Barakeh v. Minister of Def. [2002] IsrSC 56(3) 11, reproduced in
JUDGMENTS OF THE ISRAEL SUPREME COURT, supra note 70, at 77.
75 HCJ 652/81 M.K. Sarid v. Chairman of the Knesset [1982] IsrSC 36(2) 197, available at
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/81/520/006/Z01/81006520.z01.pdf. For discussion of this
case, see RUTH GAVISON, MORDECHAI KREMNITZER & YOAV DOTAN, JUDICIAL ACTIVISM, FOR
AND AGAINST: THE ROLE OF THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE IN ISRAELI SOCIETY 40-41 (2000)
(Hebrew).
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pending before the Court the right to be seated in the Knesset.76 In a
1985 case, the Court decided that a long-standing rule of the Knesset
that a single member could not move a motion of no-confidence was
unconstitutional because it discriminated against a faction of one.77
Furthermore, an attempt by the Speaker in 1984 to bar the submission of
a draft law to the Knesset on the ground that it was racist, was declared
unconstitutional.78 A member of the Knesset, it was held, was free to
submit legislative proposals, and the Speaker was not at liberty to
discriminate between one draft law and another. In the 1985 Miari
case, the Court ruled that the Knesset could not remove the immunity of
a member for participating in a public meeting in which the terrorist
leader, Arafat, had been present.79 The immunity of a Knesset member
extended beyond his immediate work in the Knesset, and his
participation in a public meeting of this kind was legitimate. Hence, he
could not be tried for such action, and stripping him of his immunity
was unconstitutional.
These cases are merely illustrative of the willingness of the Court
to intercede in a domain that has traditionally been deemed, in
separation-of-powers doctrine, the preserve of the legislative body—
whether at the level of parliamentary committees or that of the House
Speaker. Similarly, the Court has occasionally sat in judgment on
decisions of the government and declared some of these to be
unreasonable. In his book, The Judge in a Democracy, Justice Barak
lists several instances where the Court applied the test of reasonableness
as a basis for invalidating governmental decisions.80 Thus, on
application by a public-minded institution, the Court compelled a
minister and deputy minister charged with serious crimes to resign,
before any trial had taken place.81 On the other hand, the Court
determined that a lame-duck government was not barred from
negotiating a peace agreement. The Court said that such authority for a
transitional government was reasonable.82
In its handling of administrative affairs, the Israeli Supreme Court
has unquestionably fulfilled a valuable task by nullifying grossly
unpalatable decisions and demanding an exemplary standard for
governmental appointments. And to the extent that judicial intervention
and the threat of such intervention have induced the government to
76
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adopt higher standards in its selection of personnel and its decisionmaking process, the Court’s judicial review has had a salutary effect.
Yet, there is a danger that the too-ready availability and exercise of this
judicial role may ultimately attenuate the necessary self-discipline of the
governmental administrative apparatus. As Professor Stephen
Goldstein, a prominent liberal, once observed: “I don’t think judges
have a roving commission to do right. And in the long run, [judicial
involvement in governmental appointments] has an undesirable effect of
weakening other agencies . . . .”83
When judicial review of Knesset laws is invoked, the danger is that
sooner or later, the legislative-judicial clash of perspectives may spawn
a major constitutional crisis. The better part of wisdom might therefore
lead the Court to adopt a self-disciplining political question doctrine
based on the American model.
PROFESSOR MALVINA HALBERSTAM: Doctor Sokolovsky,
you had some cases that you were going to discuss.
DR. JANICE SOKOLOVSKY: I’m going to address the security
fence issue, the sanctions in Gaza case, and a few others. But, before I
do that, I want to put my thesis out: I am concerned not only with the
issues themselves, but also with who is bringing these political cases—
in particular, those cases that affect national security. And I have
learned that most are filed by approximately twenty NGOs, each of
which maintains varying levels of legitimacy in Israel.
In Israel, a non-profit organization is called an Amuta, and the law
regulating non-profit organizations is called the Amutot Law.84 In order
to be registered as an Amuta and to receive an identification number, the
organization must complete a registration form—which requires
disclosures concerning financing, activities, and personnel—and then
file annual returns. It then has a legal identity. In order to receive
funding from the Israeli government, the Amuta must make more
detailed disclosures and receive a Certificate of Proper Management (in
Hebrew, Nihul Takin). Virtually all high-quality Amutot in Israel have
the Certificate of Proper Management. However, there are many
politically active groups that are not even registered in Israel—meaning
they have no status as a legal entity in Israel—that nevertheless are able
to file Bagatz petitions in the Israeli High Court. Of even greater
concern, many Amutot, even those which are properly registered in
Israel, receive significant funding from foreign governments. I’m not
talking about foreign charities or foreign individuals; I’m talking
foreign governments, including the governments of England, Holland,
Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, Germany, Austria, and the European
Union.
83
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And my contention is this: I don’t think that any non-profit
organization, any NGO, should have access to file a Bagatz—
particularly on political or security issues—unless it meets two nonideological criteria, which would apply equally to right-wing and leftwing groups. First, it should be properly registered as an Amuta in
Israel and have received a Certificate of Proper Management. Second,
it should be disqualified if it receives funding from a foreign
government. This would be similar to what prevails in the United
States, where there are restrictions on lobbying and other forms of
political activity by groups funded by foreign governments. For
example, the Foreign Agents Registration Act85 requires transparency
for the political activities of such organizations so that if they
disseminate a report, they must identify themselves on the cover of the
report as being agents of their funding governments. That is my basic
thesis—that any NGO that files a Bagatz in Israel, or even lobbies
(although I’m not talking about lobbying now), should meet these two
criteria.
Now, I want to discuss some of the cases that Professor Slonim
talked about, for example, those cases regarding the security fence
issues. The security fence was planned to be 831 kilometers, of which
only 490 have been built to date. One particular route of 60 kilometers
was changed because of rulings of the High Court and another 100
kilometers are still under dispute, which means 160 kilometers of the
planned 831 are in limbo or have been changed because of rulings in
Bagatz cases. That’s twenty percent of the route of the security fence,
which is a matter of life and death for those of us who live in Israel. We
know that the security fence works; we know it.86
Another case was a Bagatz petition against the small Shomron
community of Migron filed primarily by two NGOs, one of which was
Peace Now,87 an extremely active filer of Bagatz petitions. However,
Peace Now is not registered in Israel. It does not have any legal
standing whatsoever and is, therefore, ironically immune from being
sued. In fact, not long ago, Peace Now wrote some very unflattering
comments about a fellow in Israel. He sued the organization for
defamation and won—perhaps 50,000 shekels—in a lower court. Yet
when he sought to collect the damages award, Peace Now successfully
85
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22 U.S.C. §§ 611-621 (2006).
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contended that it could not be forced to pay because it is not registered
in Israel—that is, since the organization doesn’t legally exist in Israel, it
cannot be sued there. Hence, Peace Now is permitted to file a Bagatz
petition that affects the route of the security fence—ultimately affecting
the placement of settlements—yet is simultaneously immune from
paying a libel claim because it is not registered. That is amazing.
Furthermore, Peace Now has been investigated for financial
irregularities regarding the manner in which it receives its funding.
Despite these investigations and its non-existence in Israel, Peace Now
continues to file Bagatz petitions. To me, this is not proper procedure.
No organization that is not registered properly in Israel should be
allowed to file a Bagatz petition.
PROFESSOR MALVINA HALBERSTAM: Do you want to tell us
a little bit about the legislation you are proposing on this?
DR. JANICE SOKOLOVSKY: That is the gist of the legislation.88
My proposed legislation would say that no group is allowed to lobby or
to file a Bagatz petition unless it meets those two criteria—that it is
properly registered in Israel with a Certificate of Proper Management,
and that it does not receive funding from foreign governments. To
show you how standard the requirement of Nihul Takin—proper
management—is, I will give you an example. Recently, I nominated
someone for the President’s Award for Volunteerism. The nominations
form stated that if you are nominating an Amuta rather than an
individual, you must attach its Certificate of Proper Management. So, if
a group needs a Certificate of Nihul Takin in order to receive an award
for volunteerism—which doesn’t affect life and death—a fortiori, it
should be required to attach such a certificate to its Bagatz petition.
This would demonstrate to the High Court that the petitioner is a legal
entity in Israel, and has made the required disclosures about its activities
and administration.
By imposing the two criteria I have proposed on NGOs that seek to
file Bagatz petitions, we could limit the quite inappropriate effect of
unregistered or foreign funded organizations on sensitive policy and
security issues.
PROFESSOR MALVINA HALBERSTAM: Judge Posner stated
that he did not want to comment on the Israeli Supreme Court here. I
would, therefore, like to read from his review of Justice Barak’s book.
Judge Posner wrote, “What Barak created out of whole cloth was a

88 Several months after this Conference, Minister Michael Eitan initiated a bill entitled “The
Duty of Disclosure for Someone Supported by a Foreign Political Entity, 5770-2010,” and Dr.
Sokolovsky participated in the drafting. On December 1, 2009, the bill was presented at a
seminar in the Knesset entitled “Foreign Government Funding for NGO Political Activity in
Israel,” at which Dr. Sokolovsky was one of the speakers. The bill was then tabled in the
Knesset.
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degree of judicial power undreamed of even by our most aggressive
Supreme Court justices.”89 He goes on to say, “Among the rules of law
that Barak’s judicial opinions have been instrumental in creating that
have no counterpart in American law are,” and he lists quite a number,
but I’ll just read a few: “that any government action that is
‘unreasonable’ is illegal (‘put simply, the executive must act reasonably,
for an unreasonable act is an unlawful act’).”90 In other words, the
Court can determine any act to be unlawful if it thinks it’s unreasonable.
And further:
[T]hat a court can countermand military orders, decide “whether to
prevent the release of a terrorist within the framework of a political
‘package deal,’” and direct the government to move the security wall
that keeps suicide bombers from entering Israel from the West Bank.
These are powers that a nation could grant its judges. . . . But
only in Israel (as far as I know) do judges confer the power of
abstract review on themselves, without benefit of a constitutional or
legislative provision.91

IV. INDIVIDUAL PRESENTATIONS
A.

Professor Daniel Friedmann: The Judge as Philospher-King

The Israeli Supreme Court began to function shortly after the
establishment of the State in 1948. For the first forty years the Court
was fairly activist, yet it maintained a number of basic rules that led to
restraint and enabled it to reach a highly balanced approach.
All this has changed in a process that began some twenty-five
years ago after the appointment of Justice Meir Shamgar as President of
the Supreme Court. Meir Shamgar served as President from 1983 until
his retirement in 1995. During this period there was considerable
expansion in the power of the Court. Yet, the Court remained cautious
in matters of defense and security and some restraints remained in force.
Upon Shamgar’s retirement, Barak became President of the Supreme
Court and whatever restraint remained on the Court’s jurisdiction was
rapidly to disappear. The following points reflect the extent of the
change.

89
90
91

Posner, supra note 55.
Id.
Id.
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The “Constitutional Revolution”

In 1992, the Knesset adopted the Basic Law of Human Dignity and
Liberty. It protects a number of human rights, but certain rights,
notably the right to equality and the right of marriage were not included.
This was done on purpose in order not to raise the opposition of the
religious parties who insist on the continuation of religious monopoly in
the field of marriage and divorce. Section 8 of the Basic Law, the
limitation clause, provides that: “There shall be no violation of rights
under this Basic Law except by a law befitting the values of the State of
Israel, enacted for a proper purpose, and to an extent no greater than is
required.”92 Members of the Knesset who voted for the Basic Law
hardly thought that they had revolutionized the legal system. But
shortly afterwards the idea that we have had a “constitutional
revolution” was greatly publicized. Justice Barak strongly advocated
this theory in his lectures and writings. In the United Mizrahi case,93
decided shortly after Shamgar’s retirement, all the Justices agreed that
there was no ground to invalidate the Law in question. This, however,
did not prevent the Court from embarking upon a lengthy discussion of
a host of constitutional questions, some of which remain unresolved to
date, including the power of the Knesset to bind itself (can the Knesset
legislate a Basic Law that can only be changed by unanimous vote?).
The end product acquired the form of an obiter of about 350 pages.
Many questions remained open. But the bottom line became clear: The
Court has power to invalidate Knesset legislation. The fact that all this
was mere dicta was drowned in the lengthy dissertations.
Barak’s presidency thus opened with the legal revolution. It is
questionable whether the limitation clause in the Basic Law was
intended to grant the Court power to invalidate Knesset legislation. It
was clearly possible to offer a more modest interpretation, since there
are no express words in the Law that authorize the Court to review
legislation.94 But, it is at least arguable that the Court’s interpretation
can be anchored in the language of the Basic Law. The next question
92
93

Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 1992, S.H. 150.
CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Coop. Vill. [1995] IsrSC 49(4) 221.
Shamgar himself was able to participate in accordance with the rule that allows a judge to deliver
a decision within three months after his retirement.
94 Section 11 of the Law provides that “[a]ll governmental authorities are bound to respect the
rights under this Basic Law.” It is not clear whether the Hebrew term that has been translated
“governmental authorities” includes the Knesset—so it was an open question whether the Basic
Law was also directed by the Knesset to the Knesset itself. In addition, it does not follow that it is
the Court that was granted the power to supervise Knesset legislation nor is it clear that legislation
that is not in line with the limitation clause becomes automatically void. An interpretation is
conceivable that requires the Knesset to deal with this matter.
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which arose related to the position of all the Basic Laws that were
enacted in the past.95 Most of the provisions in the Basic Laws are not
“entrenched” and traditionally Basic Laws were not considered as being
on a higher normative level than any other Knesset legislation and could
be changed by “ordinary” legislation.96
But all this seems of no avail against the Supreme Court’s
unlimited power of creative interpretation. Encouraged by its decision
regarding the Basic Law of Human Dignity and Liberty, the Court
stated that the mere title “Basic Law” endows the statute with
constitutional standing, and grants the Court the power to invalidate
legislation that, in the Court’s view, is not in line with the Basic Law.97
Hence, the Court without having even a shred of legitimacy, has endowed
hundreds of provisions enacted in the past with constitutional standing and
thus created a “constitution” where none existed before.
2.

Unreasonableness

Traditionally, “unreasonableness” had a very limited role in
judicial review. It was usually combined with other causes of action or
served in a number of specific situations—notably in the context of bylaws of local authorities.98 Justice Barak in a series of cases that began
shortly after his appointment to the Supreme Court succeeded in turning
it into a general cause of action upon which judicial review can be
founded.99 Initially, this development met considerable resistance,100
95 There are altogether some ten Basic Laws, most of which preceded the Basic Law of
Human Dignity and Liberty.
96 HCJ 148/73 Kniel v. Minister of Justice [1973] IsrSC 27(1) 794. There was a quasiexception to this approach: HCJ 98/69 Bergman v. Minister of Fin. [1969] IsrSC 23(1) 693. It
concerned Section 4 of the Basic Law of The Knesset, which provides that election will be direct
and equal and that this provision can only be changed by a majority of the Knesset Members (at
least sixty-one). The question that arose related to a law dealing with the finance provided by the
State to parties that participate in the election. This law denied any finance to new parties and it
was argued that this infringed the requirement of equality included in the Basic Law. The Court
answered the question in the affirmative and held that the law on party finance can only be valid
either by changing it to ensure equality or by passing it again with the required majority. It
should be noted that the Court had doubts whether the question of Knesset legislation is
justiciable, but the Attorney General was not willing to raise the point. In addition, the decision
related to an “entrenched” provision in the Basic Law, namely one that specifically requires a
special majority in order to be changed. Most provisions in the Basic Laws do not have such a
provision. Finally, the Israeli Supreme Court recognized that there is no need to change the Basic
Law itself. It suffices that the modifying law is passed by the required majority, even if it is an
“ordinary” law.
97 HCJ 212/03 Herut Nat’l Movement v. Chairman of Cent. Elections Comm. for the
Sixteenth Knesset [2003] IsrSC 57(1) 570; EA 92/03 Mofaz v. Chairman of Cent. Elections
Comm. for the Sixteenth Knesset [2003] IsrSC 57(3) 793, 810-11. The statements were mere
obiter.
98 HCJ 21/51 Binnenbaum v. Municipality of Tel-Aviv [1952] IsrSC 6, 375, 386.
99 HCJ 840/79 HaKablanim. v. Gov’t of Israel [1979] IsrSC 34(3) 729; HCJ 389/80 Dapei
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but gradually it became well established.
This cause of action led to a Court decision that ordered the
Attorney General to prosecute and quashed his decision that there was
no public interest in the indictment.101 In another case, the Court held
that an appointment by the government of the Director General of the
Ministry of Building was extremely unreasonable and should be
quashed on the ground that the person appointed was involved in a
serious crime for which he was reprieved before trial.102 An
appointment may also be quashed as being unreasonable if the
candidate expressed racial views (although he later apologized).103
Over the years the cause of action of unreasonableness continued to
grow, and in fact overshadowed all the traditional grounds for judicial
review. It is deceptively simple, it has no bounds, and it endows the
Court with almost unlimited discretion.
Consequently, every
governmental or administrative decision becomes in fact appealable and
every appointment can be challenged in court on the ground of some
misconduct in the candidate’s history.
3.

Abolition of the Requirement of Standing

The traditional rule provided that in order to submit a petition
against a public authority the applicant must have “standing.” The
explanation was that “[i]t is clear that there is no legal process unless
there is a dispute. A person must come and claim his own right or
injury. In this respect the process in court differs from that before the
legislative or the executive branch.”104 However, Justice Barak rejected
the traditional approach, and posed the rhetorical question: “[W]hat is
the moral basis for the approach that he who claims that his money was
unlawfully stolen can apply to the court, but he who claims that the
public’s money was unlawfully stolen cannot do so?”105 The
requirement of standing has thus been abolished.

Zahav Ltd. v. The Broad. Auth. [1980] IsrSC 35(1) 421.
100 Moshe Landau, On Justiciability and Reasonableness in Administrative Law, 14 TEL AVIV
U. L. REV. 5 (1989) (Hebrew); see also M. Shaked, Comments on the Review of Reasonableness
in Administrative Law, 12 MISHPATIM 102 (1982) (Hebrew).
101 HCJ 935/89 Ganor v. Att’y Gen. [1990] IsrSC 44(2) 485.
102 HCJ 6163/92 Eisenberg v. Minister of Bldg. & Hous. [1993] IsrSC 47(2) 229.
103 HCJ 4646/08 Lavi v. Prime Minister (not yet published).
104 HCJ 40/70 Becker v. Minister of Def. [1970] IsrSC 24(1) 238, 246.
105 HCJ 910/86 Ressler v. Minister of Def. [1988] IsrSC 42(2) 441, 465.
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Justiciability

In Ressler v. Minister of Defense, the Court dismissed a petition
against the Defense Minister on the ground that the matter was
nonjusticiable, but Justice Barak in a very long obiter expressed his
views on justiciability.106 He distinguished between “normative” and
“institutional” justiciability. As far as the normative aspect is
concerned, every human act be it political or any other is justiciable.
Barak was willing to concede that there is a question as to which
institution is to deal with the matter. Yet, this concession seems to be of
little moment. It is almost impossible to find any situation which in his
view will be beyond the institutional competence of the Court. Indeed,
he expressed clear reservation regarding the decision in Reiner v. Prime
Minister on diplomatic relations with Germany, posing the question as
to why it could not be examined on grounds of reasonableness.107 In
that case, Barak’s obiter remained a minority view. President Shamgar
supported the doctrine of justiciability,108 and the Vice President BenPorat considered that there is no need to decide the boundaries of
justiciability, though she was inclined to accept the approach of
President Shamgar.
When Barak became President of the Supreme Court, Shamgar and
Ben-Porat had already retired. In fact, none of the Justices that opposed
Barak’s expansive views remained on the Court and the field became
completely open. The issue of justiciability was not expressly decided.
But since then it has hardly ever been mentioned and it is practically
impossible to find modern cases dismissing an application on the
ground of nonjusticiability. In reality, every governmental action,
including military actions, can be litigated. Indeed, even the highly
political issue of evacuating the Gaza strip and the legislation that
implemented it became the subject of a lengthy decision.109 Hence, in
reality, this limitation upon the Court’s jurisdiction has been wiped out.
What is behind all this? The crux of the matter is very clear and
simple. The basic idea has been to transform the function of the Court.
The Court should no longer be merely concerned with justiciable issues
and with resolving disputes between parties. The basic function of the
Court, and this is the idea, is to oversee how the country is being run

106

The part in Barak’s decision dealing with justiciability is over thirty pages long. Id. at 472-

507.
107

Id. at 477-79 (discussing HCJ 186/65 Reiner v. Prime Minister [1965] IsrSC 19(2) 485,

487).
108 President Shamgar continues to this day to support the Reiner decision and he reaffirmed
his position in his interview in Yedioth Ahronoth. See infra note 112.
109 HCJ 1661/05 Regional Council of Gaza Beach v. The Knesset [2006] IsrSC 59(2) 481.
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and to take part in the way that it is governed. This is the reason why
the Court accepts any application from any source. The Court does not
mind who brings it. The Court says its function is to see that the
country is being run properly. Mr. Nathan Lewin mentioned that the
Israeli Supreme Court has gone into areas which to an American lawyer
are bizarre, such as reviewing the plea bargaining agreement with Mr.
Katzav, the former President of Israel. It also sounds bizarre to many
Israelis. But it all stems from the same approach. The Court wants to
control the way the executive, including the prosecution, functions.
And this is the basic issue, namely what kind of Court has been created
and what is its function.
PROFESSOR MALVINA HALBERSTAM: Can you also tell us
about the legislation that you proposed to limit the Supreme Court in
Israel?
PROFESSOR DANIEL FRIEDMANN: I tried to reintroduce the
idea of justiciability and I made a list of matters that are not justiciable,
for example, the way the government is formed. It is unfortunate that
the reintroduction of the idea of justiciability has to be done by way of
legislation. One would have expected the Court to reach it on its own,
but if it does not, I think eventually there will have to be legislation.
PROFESSOR MALVINA HALBERSTAM: Were there specific
issues that you said would be nonjusticiable?
PROFESSOR DANIEL FRIEDMANN: In the bill that I prepared,
which was not submitted to the Knesset, I included certain matters of
war and peace, certain matters of foreign relationship, and a general
provision saying that the Court should not deal with nonjusticiable
matters, leaving it to the Court to at least address the issue. Currently,
the Court does not even recognize that there is an issue. It assumes
automatically that everything is justiciable.
The Court’s approach did not remain unchallenged. Let me refer
to two interviews that were given by former Presidents of the Supreme
Court. One was given by former President Moshe Landau, who retired
in 1982. He gave the interview eighteen years later.110 Landau leveled
a devastating attack on Aharon Barak and the Supreme Court. I would
say that the review by Judge Posner of Barak’s book seems very
moderate in comparison. President Landau spoke of Barak leading the
Court the wrong way and that the Court is assuming governmental
power and that it gets involved in a morass of political opinions and
beliefs, which is dangerous both for the State and for the Court. To the
question as to whether the Court has lost its humility, Landau replied:
Most definitely. It displays arrogance and pretension. In The
Republic, Plato suggested entrusting the government of the republic
110 See Ari Shavit, Judgment Day, HA’ARETZ (Tel Aviv), Oct. 6, 2000, available at
http://christianactionforisrael.org/isreport/septoct00/landau.html.
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to a class of elders who were specially trained and educated for this
purpose. It sometimes seems to me that most of the justices on the
Supreme Court see themselves more or less as governing elders.111

Another former President of the Supreme Court, Meir Shamgar, in
a more recent interview stated:
I consider that not everything is justiciable. There are topics that
belong to the province of other branches—the legislative or the
executive. . . . I think that separation of powers should be
maintained and that each branch should be allowed to deal with its
own matters. . . . I do not think that there is a tendency to weaken
the Court. There is a tendency to prevent the Court from dealing
with matters that it should not deal with.112

Shamgar gave the famous example of Reiner v. Prime Minister,113
which was concerned with the government decision to establish
diplomatic relations with West Germany. The Germans appointed Rolf
Pauls, who was an officer in the German army in World War II, as their
first ambassador. Mr. Reiner applied to the Supreme Court for an order
to prevent Mr. Pauls from entering the country. Justice Sussman, in a
brief decision less than one page long, stated:
This is not a legal matter but a purely political one; it cannot be
scrutinized by legal standards. The question of confirming or
rejecting a foreign ambassador is a political matter to be decided by
the Minister of Foreign Affairs or possibly the whole government.
This is not a legal matter that can be examined in court.114

This was the end of the matter. But then came Barak, who said
that everything is justiciable. Since we have this fantastic cause of
action of unreasonableness, which by the way is itself unreasonable, it is
possible to adjudicate everything. It is even reasonable for the Court to
decide whether it is reasonable to establish diplomatic relations with
Germany, or to confirm the German ambassador. The Reiner case is the
product of the “old” Supreme Court. And I would say that for about
forty years we had an excellent Supreme Court which acquired
enormous prestige and had unequaled moral power. It knew when it
should be active, but it also realized its limits. Now, all of this is over.
It has been erased by the Court of Barak—part of it already in the days
of Shamgar, but much of it in the days of Barak.
What happened to our Supreme Court is that it appropriated great
legal power, but lost most of its moral power. If you look at the kind of
111
112

Id.
Arik Carmon & Amira Lam, Not Everything Is Justiciable, YEDIOTH AHRONOTH (Tel
Aviv), Apr. 17, 2009, at 19 (translation from Hebrew).
113 HCJ 186/65 Reiner v. Prime Minister [1965] IsrSC 19(2) 485, 487. Justice Sussmann
became President of the Supreme Court and upon his resignation due to illness he was replaced
by Justice Landau.
114 Id.
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support that the Supreme Court had when Barak came into office and
the kind of support that it had when he left the office, you can see the
drastic fall in public support of the Supreme Court.
There’s another point that I shall briefly mention. It relates to the
Attorney General. It is relevant because the Court’s power is also
reflected in the position of the Attorney General. The Attorney General
is the government’s legal advisor. Yet it was held by the Supreme
Court that the government is bound to follow his advice.115 Thus, the
opinion of the Attorney General is no longer advice but a command.
Consequently, since unreasonableness is a ground for judicial review
and everything is justiciable, the Attorney General can intervene in any
governmental action. He can tell the government that in his view a
certain appointment or some governmental decision is unreasonable,
and the government will have to abide by this kind of advice. That’s the
kind of situation in which the government finds itself.
Finally, the question is how could all of this have happened? Why
has there been no parliamentary reaction? This is an important
question, but I have no time to expand on it, so it will have to await
another day.
B.

Justice Elyakim Rubinstein

To a great extent, this Conference has so far been imbalanced. As
you can see, our Court has been attacked by most of the Israeli
participants except myself and also by Professor Posner, and Professor
Halberstam in a way. It is a pity because the picture that has been
drawn here is, in my view, much distorted, despite the fact that not only
is criticism of the Court or any other institution legitimate, but it could
also be constructive, and my colleagues and I learn a lot from what
people write.
Unlike the United States or Canada, our country is still coping with
existential problems, and this is besides the internal problems between
Jews and Arabs, religious and non-religious Jews, and left and right.
And the complexity of all of that must be borne in mind when you come
to review the work of the Court.
Israel is a Jewish and democratic State. It is so defined in the two
Basic Laws on human rights promulgated in 1992, the Basic Law of
Human Dignity and Liberty and the Basic Law of Freedom of
Occupation. In the Declaration of Independence of 1948 it was
proclaimed as a Jewish State, but it was democratic from the beginning.
Indeed, the Jewish population in the pre-state period had democratic
115

HCJ 4267/93 Amitai v. Prime Minister [1993] IsrSC 47(5) 441, 473.
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institutions, sometimes named “state-on-the-way” or “state-in-themaking.” And the democratic principles are explicitly embedded in the
Declaration of Independence, which serves in the Basic Laws of 1992
as a statutory-constitutional source of interpretation. Beyond that, a
democratic state is relatively easy to define. What is a Jewish State is of
course very complex, very difficult from many aspects.
The Supreme Court was established in the beginning of the State of
Israel and it had to cope for its status in those days. The gap that existed
between the first generation of the Justices and the government was
great. For the first fifteen years of independence, David Ben-Gurion,
the founding father, was at the helm while the Court had to establish its
place, being composed of important lawyers and scholars, but not at all
publicly recognized or well-known. But it did a marvelous job, as even
in those days it dealt with cases concerning human and civil rights,
including the freedom of expression, the situation of Israeli Arabs, etc.,
and had the courage to face the government and insist on those rights.
The Court became the guardian of human rights before any legislation.
In 1992, the two Basic Laws dealing with civil rights were
promulgated—raising rights proclaimed by the Court to a constitutional
level. Based on these, the Court in 1995 established its power of
judicial review, in United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Cooperative
Village.116 I believe it was a very proper decision, even if the Knesset
made a mistake from its point of view, or did not pay attention to the
meaning of its legislative act. It is too late to change today, and the
Knesset will not do it, in my view. But the application of judicial
review has been very meager, in a few cases, most of them really
matters which are not at the center of public interest. The Court has
shown great restraint in constitutional judicial review, and I do not think
anybody could argue about that.117
Other than constitutional questions, we constantly look at
humanitarian problems, which are within the regular work of the Court.
Civil and human rights are high up on our docket. The Court has tried
to balance between the need for erecting the security fence between
Israel and the Palestinian Authority territories to protect our population
from murderous terrorism, and the difficulties that it created to noncombatant Palestinians, passage to their fields, and the like. So what the
Court did was to insert changes in the route of the fence that would
enable easier movement for Palestinians. There is no Guantanamo in
Israel, but cases of the Guantanamo type would have come to our Court
in a matter of days, and would be decided quickly.
116
117

CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Coop. Vill. [1995] IsrSC 49(4) 221.
In December 2009, the Court abolished a law privatizing a prison. See HCJ 2605/05
Academic Ctr. of Law & Bus. v. Minister of Fin. (Nov. 19, 2009), available at
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/05/050/026/n39/05026050.n39.pdf.
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Indeed, you could argue that this or that case should or should not
have been taken by the Court. I would like to repeat, and this is
something which is said responsibly, and I myself have been a student
of the Court for many years—at the end of the day, the involvement of
the Court has had a very positive effect on our government and its
quality. The Court has decided many times on questions of inequality
of Israeli Arabs, on improper government appointments, budgeting
inequality, and inequality in general. Personally, I support these
decisions.
I support, for instance, going into appointments issues because in
such cases, you help the government to avoid appointing people whose
backgrounds demonstrate that they could not serve the public. It
usually has to be not just unreasonable, but extremely unreasonable, for
the Court to interfere. “Extremely unreasonable” means that no honest
government could appoint this person to that particular job. All such
decisions are transparent and available for any criticism.
Two last words, one about President Barak. Barak has been
attacked here. He is not here. Barak is a great jurist; in my view, he’s
in a league by himself. He is not only that. He was a great judge. He
could make mistakes. All of us can make mistakes. I think that
demonizing his work in a way is unfair to him. I was in a minority
against his view in certain cases when we sat together. Barak has been
a judicial leader, but he has also been part of a group. He has
contributed a lot to the State of Israel. He is one of the most respected
and recognized jurists in the world. He has earned his proper place in
history.
Criticism of the Court is legitimate. It is an integral part of the
democratic discourse and the democratic discussion. The dialogue
between branches of government is vital; so is the media debate. The
problem lies elsewhere—it lies with the effort to delegitimize the Court
by certain circles. By portraying the Court—a hard-working
professional institution which renders an important service to the
country and to the public—sometimes as a power-mongering group of
people, sometimes as a corrupt body, the confidence of various
segments of the Israeli society is being eroded. That is highly
unfortunate. The Court will in any way continue its work to the best of
its abilities and carry the load. It may make mistakes—who doesn’t—
but definitely its existence is vital for the State and its citizens, for
human rights, and for civil rights. I am proud to be part of it.
Finally, the institution of the Attorney General of Israel was
mentioned. Having served in this position for almost seven years, let
me add that the convention according to which the government and all
its agencies on all levels are bound by the legal opinions of the Attorney
General (subject to judicial scrutiny) has proven itself in preventing
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irresponsible and illegal decisions and actions, not to mention (not too
often, of course) corruption.
PROFESSOR MALVINA HALBERSTAM: Thank you. I just
wanted to say that Justice Barak was invited to the Conference. In fact,
the initial impetus for this Conference was a report by Steve Greenwald,
the President of the American Association of Jewish Lawyers and
Jurists (AAJLJ), to the AAJLJ Board, of a conversation he had with
Justice Barak in which Barak told him that the Israeli Supreme Court
was under attack. Mr. Greewald suggested that we adopt a resolution
supporting the Court. Following the discussion that ensued, we decided
to organize this Conference. Steve Greenwald spoke to Justice Barak
several times to ask him if he would participate. We even offered to
scheduled the Conference at a date of his choosing. Had he come, it
wouldn’t have been unbalanced. But at the end, he decided not to
come. So, it’s not our fault that he’s not here and that the panel is
unbalanced.
JUDGE RICHARD POSNER: I’m a Darwinian, and I believe that
all organs, including artificial ones—institutions—are engaged in a
struggle for survival, and that the losers become extinct. So courts will
try to maximize their political power, and if the other branches are
weak, then the courts will become extremely powerful. And it’s
possible—that’s why I have reservations about criticizing Justice Barak
not for his general jurisprudence but for his activity in the Israeli
context—that the Israeli Supreme Court is filling a vacuum of some sort
in the politics of Israel. That is, I think, an implication of what Justice
Rubinstein was just saying. One reason that this hasn’t happened in the
United States is precisely the political character of Supreme Court
appointments. Our Supreme Court is very aggressive, and it would like
to increase its power and fill political vacuums like everyone else. But
when the Supreme Court has overplayed its hand, as it did before the
Civil War, as it did in the Great Depression of the thirties, and as it did
in the sixties (the Warren Court), there was always the possibility for
the other branches to strike back, particularly through the appointments
process. If our Supreme Court gets to be an overmighty subject of the
separation of powers, there is the possibility of a political retribution
and change. And that is very important and healthy.
If you have a system in which the Justices appoint their successors,
which I gather is the de facto system in Israel, that will reduce the
power of the other branches. It will unbalance the balance of powers,
and it will make the Court exceptionally powerful and that can be a
serious mistake and a source of great political strife.
MINISTER MICHAEL EITAN: I wholly agree with Justice
Rubinstein’s comments that the Israeli Supreme Court has had an
important, positive impact on Israeli democracy, probably more so than
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any other branch in the political system. And despite differences in our
world views, I acknowledge that Justice Barak has made major
contributions to Israeli democracy.
Let’s take, for example, the issue of freedom of speech. To this
day, no Israeli legislator has managed to pass a law protecting the basic
right of freedom of speech. Nevertheless, Israeli citizens enjoy a high
level of freedom of speech, based on court decisions resulting from the
judicial activism of the Israeli Supreme Court. Even in the early days of
the State, when the executive branch was very powerful under the
leadership of Ben-Gurion, the Israeli Supreme Court chose to confront
the executive branch on this issue and developed the right of freedom of
speech through its rulings.
Still, I think something is wrong with our balance of powers. The
judicial branch succeeded—via a judicial activist strategy and the
weakness of the other two branches—in accumulating political power at
the expense of the other branches. For example, the Basic Law of
Human Dignity and Liberty has been interpreted broadly by the Israeli
Supreme Court, which in many cases has generated resentment among
the majority of the members of the Knesset. While hypothetically the
Knesset could refute such rulings of the Israeli Supreme Court by
passing legislation, it refrains from doing so due to its weak public
image.
Ultimately, all three branches need to work in balance for the
people. Each branch needs to understand its powers and limits. The
equilibrium of the governmental system is dependent on the selfrestraint of each branch. Certainly, there are overlapping areas of
authority and gray areas. Nevertheless, there are clear cases of
distortion of the separation of power between the branches—for
example, when the Israeli Supreme Court interprets the scope of its
authority to permit instructing the government to act illegally. In such
cases, where judges put themselves above the law and thereby destroy
the sensitive equilibrium, the other branches should act to rein in the
judiciary.
PROFESSOR MALVINA HALBERSTAM: I just want to make
two very brief points. One, I want to make it very clear that, as I heard
the attacks on the Supreme Court, they were not attacks on the Justices
of the Supreme Court or even in many cases on its decisions. They
were attacks on the fact that the Court takes certain cases—a
disagreement about the proper role of the Court. There was nothing
personal in it. The other point I would like to make is the point that
Judge Posner made. Because it is a political process in the United
States, the composition of the Court swings back and forth and it’s
balanced. The Court may go a little too far in one direction and then a
different President appoints different Justices and then the Court may go
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a little too far in the other direction. But, it keeps going back and forth.
That’s a limitation that does not exist in Israel at this point.
I’ll ask Mr. Cotler to sum up and give us his views.
C.

Hon. Irwin Cotler

I’m going to speak about Canada’s constitutional revolution, at the
center of which was the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.118
My basic thesis is that the Charter of Rights and Freedoms—a
parliamentary enactment—has had a transformative impact not only on
our laws but on our lives, not only on how we litigate but on how we
live. Canadians now enjoy a panoply of rights and remedies that were
inconceivable in pre-Charter law.
Life and law before the Charter, from 1867 up to 1982, was a
narrative of discrimination against disadvantaged groups in Canada,
whether they be aboriginal people, women, racial and religious
minorities, disabled individuals, or, more recently, gays and lesbians.
But more than that, it was state-sanctioned discrimination. Very often
these discriminations were institutionalized at law, and so from a legal
perspective there was no constitutional right to equality. There were no
entrenched constitutional rights of any kind and no constitutional right
to a remedy.
If you were to look at the first 115 years of Canadian constitutional
history, it would reveal a preoccupation with the division of powers
between the federal government and the provinces rather than with
limitations on the exercise of power, whether federal or provincial. As
our former Chief Justice Bora Laskin summed it up, anytime a question
of civil liberties came before the courts, the real question was which of
the two levels of government had the power to work the injustice, not
whether the injustice itself could be prohibited. In other words, it was a
powers process, a question of jurisdictional trespass, but not a rights
process. Then came the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and, on its
tenth anniversary, a subsequent Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,
Justice Lamer, spoke of it as “[a] revolution on the scale of the
introduction of the metric system, the great medical discoveries of Louis
Pasteur, and the invention of penicillin and the laser.”119 You’ll never
find a legal act that has such a set of metaphors attached to it in terms of
its purported revolutionary impact. Still another former Justice of the
118 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.).
119 David Taras, Mass Media Reporting of Canadian Supreme Court Decisions: Mapping the
Terrain, 25 CANADIAN J. COMM. 397 (2000), available at http://www.cjc-online.ca/index.php/
journal/article/view/1166/1085.
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Supreme Court intimated, on the fifth anniversary of the Charter, that in
Canada the cords of liberty had been stretched more in five years than
they had in the United States in two hundred years.
Such a constitutional revolution could not happen without
controversy. There were concerns then, and there are concerns now.
First, that the Charter of Rights and Freedoms would inhibit police and
prosecutorial work—that it effectively coddled criminals and
undermined the government’s ability to protect national security.
Second, that unelected, unaccountable, unrepresentative judges would
usurp the power of Parliament on fundamental questions of public
policy or core values. Third, largely on the part of the Quebecois
separatist party in Parliament, that the Charter effected not only a
transfer of power from the courts to Parliament but a transfer of power
to a federal institution—as they termed it—namely, the Supreme Court
of Canada. Fourth, largely on the part of critical legal theorists, that the
Charter was in effect the instrument of corporations because they had
the resources to invoke it whereas the disadvantaged did not. Fifth, that
the Charter of Rights spawned a kind of industry of rights claimants,
and that this would undermine the communitarian ethos of Canada.
All the same, the Charter’s revolutionary impact was and is
evident. Specifically, it was a revolution in five acts. Act one was the
announcement of the Charter project. With that, Canada declared its
intention to move from being a parliamentary democracy to being a
constitutional democracy. The courts moved from being the arbiters of
federal-provincial jurisdictional concerns to being guarantors of rights.
Through the Charter, Parliament vested in them that power.
Act two was the transformative role played by civil society in this
process. The adoption of the Charter was preceded by a year of joint
Senate and House of Commons committee hearings on the proposed
new constitutional document. It was referred to as the year of the
constitution. Hundreds of groups came to Parliament Hill to testify, and
every single section of the resulting document bore the imprint of that
process. For example, with regard to Section 15, the Equality Rights
Section, women’s groups found the language of protection proposed by
the government to be vague. The draft Section spoke of every
individual having the right to equality before the law. Civil society
wanted every individual to be accorded the right to equality before the
law and under the law, as well as equal protection and treatment of the
laws, and, in particular, protection against discrimination. As a result,
twelve grounds were enumerated on which discrimination would
henceforth be prohibited.
Subsection 2 of Section 15, relating to affirmative action, likewise
flowed from this consultative process. What the United States has not
been able to do, if you will, in 200 years, we constitutionalized in our
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Charter of Rights. Express protections for aboriginal people were
incorporated, as well as a general reference to Canada’s multi-cultural
society, elevating such protections into a constitutional norm.
Section 11(g) is an interesting, indeed unusual provision. It states
that retroactivity shall not avail as a defense against prosecution where
the crimes are criminal according to international law or according to
the general principles of law recognized by the community of nations.
That provision resulted from the concern of community groups that
prosecution of Nazi war criminals might be struck down on grounds of
retroactivity.
Act three is the impact of the global human rights movement and
international human rights law on the rights protection principles
articulated in the Charter. Judgment after judgment by the Supreme
Court of Canada has affirmed that international law shall be a relevant
and persuasive authority with respect to the interpretation and
application of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Whereas in the
entire pre-Charter law there was only one case that applied
international human rights law to rights protection in Canada, since
1982 there have been countless more. Indeed, the second edition of
Professor William Schabas’s book on the impact of international rights
on domestic law listed forty such cases. In the third edition of the same
book, the author stopped counting.120 He said there was no longer any
point.
Act four is certain unique cases, of which I will cite just one
because it goes to all the key questions of justiciability, standing, and
the like. The case was decided within a year of the Charter’s advent. It
was called the Operation Dismantle case.121 It involved a coalition of
disarmament and other activist groups seeking to enjoin the flight
testing of U.S. cruise missiles over Canadian territory on the ground that
such tests would escalate the Cold War arms race. The coalition argued
that allowing such tests would violate every individual’s right to life,
liberty, and security under Section 7 of the new Charter. The
government lawyer at the time, Ian Binnie, who now sits on the
Supreme Court, asked that the case be dismissed on the grounds that it
was a frivolous and vexatious abuse of process that failed to disclose
any reasonable cause of action. But the case’s crux was the question
whether the Charter of Rights and Freedoms applies to the executive
branch of government. A literal reading of the Charter arguably
indicated that it applied only to acts of Parliament. But the courts
concluded that it applied to the executive branch of government.
120 WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND THE CANADIAN
CHARTER (3d ed. 2006).
121 Operation Dismantle v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441 (Can.), available at
http://gw-scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/1985/1985scr1-441/1985scr1-441.html.
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Act five is the Charter’s impact on the role of the Minister of
Justice and Attorney General. This is manifold. First, the Minister of
Justice was given responsibility for certifying every prospective act of
Parliament as comporting with the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms. If a prospective act is not so certified, it cannot proceed.
This requirement applies to every parliamentary initiative of every
agency and department of government. Second, the Minister of Justice
bears responsibility for any interventions before the Supreme Court.
Third, the Minister must insure that all prosecutions in fact comport
with constitutional obligations, full disclosure, and the like. Fourth, the
Minister has the unique responsibility in matters of wrongful
convictions. As Minister of Justice, I handled the fallout of the
wrongful conviction of a man named Stephen Truscott, forty-six years
after the man had originally been convicted. Fifth, extradition is also an
exclusive power of the Minister, along with the particular responsibility
of making sure any decision to extradite comports with the Charter.
For all of these reasons, I conclude that the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms has had a transformative impact not only on our laws but our
lives. It has attracted its share of controversy as a result, but what is
uncontroversial is that the Charter has made for a revolutionary
experience.

